Arbitration/Litigation Interface: The European Debate by Moses, Margaret L.
Loyola University Chicago, School of Law
LAW eCommons
Faculty Publications & Other Works
2014
Arbitration/Litigation Interface: The European
Debate
Margaret L. Moses
Loyola University Chicago, School of Law, mmoses1@luc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/facpubs
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications & Other Works
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Moses, Margaret L., Arbitration/Litigation Interface: The European Debate, 35 NW. J. Int’l. L & Bus 1(2014).
CLUNE (DO NOT DELETE)  3/12/15 7:51 AM 
 
Copyright  2014  by  Northwestern  University  School  of  Law Printed  in  U.S.A. 
Northwestern  Journal of International Law & Business Vol.  35,  No.  1 
1 
 
Arbitration/Litigation Interface: The European 
Debate 
 
By Margaret Moses* 
 
Abstract: In recent years, there has been a debate in the European 
Union over the need to provide a transparent and predictable 
interface between international arbitration and cross-border 
litigation.  That debate has recently culminated in the issuance of the 
Recast Brussels Regulation (the Recast), effective January 10, 2015.  
However, the Recast has not provided a method to accomplish this 
interface because it does not prevent parallel proceedings.  Parallel 
proceedings occur when a party that had agreed to arbitrate 
nonetheless goes to court while the other party proceeds with 
arbitration.  These parallel proceedings undermine the effectiveness of 
arbitration because of increased cost, inefficiency, and delay, as well 
as the high risk of inconsistent judgments.  Because of the global 
impact of international commercial arbitration, the significance of the 
European decision echoes beyond its borders.  This Article discusses 
the background leading to the Recast, interpretive issues arising from 
the Recast—particularly in light of the explanatory Recital 12 found in 
the preamble to the Recast—as well as the need for a harmonized 
consensus on preventing parallel proceedings.  It concludes by 
proposing various means for encouraging flexible solutions to the 
problem. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
For the past few years, there has been extensive controversy in Europe 
about how international commercial arbitration should interface with 
litigation.  For litigated matters, the Brussels I Regulation (Brussels I, the 
Brussels I Regulation, or the Regulation) deals with the jurisdiction of 
courts and recognition and enforcement of judgments in the Member States 
of the European Union.1  Arbitration, however, is excluded from the 
Regulation’s regime.2  Arbitration was excluded from the original Brussels 
Convention in 19683 because it was believed that the United Nations 
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(the New York Convention)4 and the 1961 European Convention on 
International Commercial Arbitration5 already sufficiently regulated 
international commercial arbitration.  Forty-six years later, however, it is 
apparent that a number of issues are not governed either by the New York 
Convention or the Brussels I Regulation.6  The latest efforts of the 
European Union to deal with the arbitration/litigation interface are 
contained in the recently promulgated Recast Brussels Regulation (the 
Recast Regulation, Brussels Recast, or the Recast).7  Although the Recast 
 
 1 Council Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J.  (L 12) 1 (EC) [hereinafter 
Brussels I]. 
 2 Id. art. 1(2)(d) (“The Regulation shall not apply to . . . arbitration.”). 
 3 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
1968 O.J. (L 299) 15 (EC), revised in 1978 O.J. (L 304) 77, revised in 1982 O.J. (L 388) 30.  The 
Brussels I Regulation has superseded the Brussels Convention. 
 4 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention].  The New York Convention requires 
courts of contracting states to enforce both arbitral agreements (Article II) and awards (Article V).  Id.  
More than 150 countries are parties to the New York Convention.  See Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958) (the “New York Convention”), 
UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2014).  One of the reasons for the growth of international commercial arbitration is 
that awards are readily enforceable under the New York Convention because the grounds for non-
enforcement are quite narrow. Basically, an award cannot be refused enforcement for a mistake of law 
or fact by the arbitrator, but rather only if there was a defect in the integrity of the process. 
5 Final Act of the Special Meeting of Plenipotentiaries for the Purpose of Negotiating and Signing a 
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 349; see 
also Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 13 [hereinafter the Jenard Report] (explaining the 1968 Brussels 
Convention). 
 6 See infra Part IV.A. 
 7 Regulation 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
(Recast), 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1 [hereinafter Brussels Recast].  Although the Brussels Recast was 
published in the Official Journal, it will not apply until January 10, 2015.  Id.  The “recast” procedure is 
one in which the only issues put forward by the Commission for review by other European Institutions 
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clarifies some issues, it does not provide a transparent and predictable 
interface between arbitration and cross-border litigation; thus, it does not 
appear to prevent inefficient parallel proceedings8 with a high risk of 
inconsistent judgments.  Because of the global importance of international 
commercial arbitration, the significant participation of the European Union 
in international economic activity,9 and the increasing role of U.S. counsel 
in international arbitrations,10 this Article addresses the major steps along 
the way toward the Recast Regulation, the conflicting perspectives that 
were considered, the result that was forged from the input of many different 
stakeholders, the unresolved issues, and some possible solutions. 
As global economic activity has increased, international commercial 
arbitration has become the generally utilized means to resolve the inevitable 
disputes that arise between parties to international contracts.11  The 
 
are those that have been addressed by the Commission in its Proposal.  Other issues can only be 
discussed if the Commission agrees or if all Member States agree.  See P.A. Nielsen, The State of Play 
of the Recast of the Brussels I Regulation, 81 NORDIC J. OF INT’L L. 585, 587 (2012). 
 8 Parallel proceedings can occur in either litigation or arbitration when the same parties 
simultaneously pursue the same dispute in two different venues. It occurs in litigation when the 
respective parties begin actions on the same facts in two different jurisdictions.  See NADJA ERK, 
PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: A COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
16–24 (2014).  With respect to arbitration, it occurs when one party begins an arbitration, while the 
other files a lawsuit on the same facts in a different jurisdiction.  See id.  The issue of parallel 
proceedings becomes quite complex under the Brussels Regulation because of the questions of how 
enforcement will proceed and which laws will govern when there are inconsistent results between 
arbitration awards and court judgments. 
 9 See The EU in the World - Economy and Finance, EUROSTAT, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
statistics_explained/index.php/The_EU_in_the_world_-_economy_and_finance (last visited Sept. 18, 
2014) (“In 2010, world GDP was valued at EUR 47,570 billion . . . . The EU-27 accounted for a 25.8% 
share of the world’s GDP in 2010, while the United States accounted for a 22.9% share.”). 
 10  Today, U.S. lawyers are involved in arbitrations in all parts of the world.  It is not unusual to find 
U.S. law firms involved on both sides of major international arbitrations in which neither the claimant 
nor the respondent is a U.S. company.  See generally Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard, AM. 
LAW., July 1, 2013.  For example, in a $48 billion arbitration that is being arbitrated in London between 
a Bahamas Company as the claimant and Swiss, Russian, and Jersey companies as respondents, the 
claimant’s counsel is DLA Piper LLP (now a “global” firm, but with many U.S. lawyers) and the 
respondent’s counsel includes Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Bryan Cave LLP.  Id.  Among treaty disputes, 
in a $114 billion treaty arbitration, which is being arbitrated at the Hague and involving companies from 
the Isle of Man and Cyprus versus the Russian Federation, claimant’s counsel is Shearman & Sterling 
LLP and respondent’s counsel is Baker Botts L.L.P. and Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP.  Id.  
Moreover, many large U.S. law firms have offices abroad that are representing European companies in 
arbitrations held in Member States.  Id.  In a $4.8 billion controversy between a Finnish utility and a 
Franco–German construction consortium being arbitrated in Stockholm, claimant’s counsel includes 
Shearman & Sterling LLP and Baker & McKenzie and respondent’s counsel includes White & Case 
LLP.  Id.  Many international commercial arbitrations are held in major arbitral centers such as London, 
Paris, and Stockholm where they are subject to European law.  Id.  For these arbitrations, consideration 
of the Recast Regulation reveals particular concerns and perspectives that Europeans bring to bear on 
the interface between arbitration and litigation. 
 11  Understanding the parameters of the Recast Regulation can help counsel prepare for the impact 
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concerns in Europe relating to the arbitration/litigation interface were based 
in large part on the impact of parallel proceedings on the arbitration process 
and the potential for inconsistent judgments. 
Arbitration is attractive in part because the parties do not want to 
resolve their disputes in the national court of the other party.  Instead, they 
agree to arbitrate.  However, once a dispute arises, one party may 
nonetheless commence an action in court (usually the court of its home 
country).  The other party pursues arbitration in the country the parties have 
chosen as the seat of the arbitration (usually a neutral third country).  The 
parallel proceedings that result are highly undesirable because of the cost, 
inefficiency, and delay they cause and because of the risk that inconsistent 
decisions will result.  The party bringing the action in court may have a 
legitimate reason to challenge the validity of the arbitration agreement, but 
raising the issue in its home country court—rather than in the agreed-upon 
arbitration forum—may also be a tactic to delay and harass the other party. 
Under the New York Convention, courts are required to refer parties 
who come before them challenging the validity of an arbitration agreement 
to arbitration, unless the court finds that the arbitration agreement is “null 
and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.”12  Nothing in the 
Convention, however, deals with the timing or priority of individual courts 
when deciding this issue. 
One way to prevent parallel proceedings in arbitration is for the court 
at the seat of arbitration to issue an anti-suit injunction.  This is an order by 
the court to the party refusing to arbitrate that it must discontinue the other 
litigation.13  In common law countries, the courts are willing under certain 
 
that the Recast will have on international commercial arbitration when it becomes effective in 2015.  
Arbitration has an increasingly global scope in its application and practice.  International caseloads of 
the major international arbitral institutions nearly doubled between 1993 and 2003 and more than tripled 
during the same period in the American Arbitration Association and its International Centre for Dispute 
Resolution.  See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL & RICHARD W. NAIMARK, TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 341 (2005).  The European Union 
and its twenty-eight Member States play a huge role in international commerce and, as a result, have a 
significant impact on international commercial arbitration.  Id.  In light of this, United States businesses 
and their counsel should understand the kinds of changes that will accompany the adoption and 
application of the Brussels Recast Regulation. 
 12  New York Convention, supra note 4, art. II(3). 
13  See, e.g., Quaak v. Klyveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren 361 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(enjoining one party from maintaining an action in Belgium in which it was asking the Belgian court to 
impose penalties on any party seeking its records in Belgium).  Anti-suit injunctions in arbitration may 
also be sought in order to keep a party from vacating an award or from enforcing an award that has been 
vacated.  However, the kind of anti-suit injunction that is the focus of this Article is one to protect an 
arbitration agreement and to prevent parallel proceedings.  Anti-suit injunctions issued at the beginning 
of a dispute to protect the tribunal’s jurisdiction are generally more favored than anti-suit injunctions 
issued after the conclusion of the arbitration to prevent enforcement.  See S.I. Strong, Border 
Skirmishes: the Intersection Between Litigation and International Commercial Arbitration, 2012 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 1, 14 (2012) (“[A]nti-suit injunctions sought at the beginning or in the middle of a legal 
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circumstances to grant anti-suit injunctions.14  Courts in civil law countries, 
however, typically do not grant anti-suit injunctions.15  In the European 
Union, Member State courts are prohibited from issuing anti-suit 
injunctions with respect to litigation under Brussels I.16  Moreover, under 
Allianz SpA v. West Tankers Inc. (West Tankers or West Tankers 2009)17—a 
controversial decision that will be discussed more fully below—that 
prohibition was extended to arbitration, thereby banning a mechanism that 
might otherwise limit the undesirable results of parallel proceedings. 
In the past few years in Europe, there have been numerous discussions, 
papers, proposals, and court decisions dealing with parallel proceedings and 
arbitration.18  The concern in the European Union is that even though an 
 
dispute would be presumptively permitted, to the extent that the injunction attempts to enjoin litigation 
in favor of arbitration.”). 
14  Anti-suit injunctions are used in both litigation and arbitration.  In the United States, courts are 
split on the proper standard for granting an anti-suit injunction.  See Steven R. Swanson, Antisuit 
Injunctions in Support of International Arbitration, 81 TUL. L. REV. 395, 412–15 (2006).  The 
“conservative” standard has been adopted by the District of Columbia, Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits 
while the “liberal” approach has been endorsed by the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.  Id.  The 
conservative approach to granting foreign anti-suit injunctions holds that granting the anti-suit 
injunction would in essence bar a foreign court from hearing a claim, thereby causing serious 
international comity implications.  Id.  The liberal approach is less concerned about international 
comity, but rather focuses on whether the duplicative litigation is vexatious and creates unnecessary 
additional costs or duplicative efforts.  Id.  Although all courts have concerns about comity and therefore 
some reluctance to grant anti-suit injunctions, U.S. courts are somewhat more likely to grant injunctions 
in arbitration than in litigation because of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration.  See, e.g., Daniel 
Rainier, The Impact of West Tankers on Parties’ Choice of a Seat of Arbitration, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
431, 452–53 (2010) (“[Mitsubishi] was certainly a strong indicator that parties with arbitration 
agreements would be expected to honor them and compelled to do so if they did not.  It is a logical 
progression for courts to use equitable relief in the form of antisuit injunctions to enforce arbitration 
agreements and to further the federal policy favoring arbitration.”). 
 15  See John J. Barcelo III, Anti-Foreign-Suit Injunctions to Enforce Arbitration Agreements, in 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 
2007 107 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2008) (“Civil law jurisdictions generally find anti-foreign-suit 
injunctions offensive, even violative of international law.”). 
 16  Case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. I-3565.  However, a Member State, such as 
England, could issue an anti-suit injunction against a party to an arbitration agreement that brought a 
court action based on the same matters in a non-Member State court.  Id. 
 17  Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663. 
 18  The extensive literature on this subject has been discussed by many commentators.  See, e.g., 
Luca G. Radicati Di Brozolo, Arbitration and the Draft Revised Brussels I Regulation: Seeds of Home 
Country Control and of Harmonisation?, 7 J. OF PRIV. INT’L L. 423, 423 n.1 (2011); see also Massimo 
Benedettelli, Communitarization of International Arbitration: A New Spectre Haunting Europe?, 27 
ARB. INT’L 583, 585 n.6 (2011); Martin Illmer, Brussels I and Arbitration Revisited, 75 RABELSZ BD. 
645, 647 n.9 (2011); C. Kessedjian, Le Règlement 44/2001 et l’Arbitrage [Regulation 44/2001 and 
Arbitration], 4 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE: BULLETIN DU COMITÉ FRANÇAIS DE L’ARBITRAGE [REVIEW OF 
ARBITRATION: BULLETIN FROM THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF ARBITRATION] 699 (2009); C. Kessedjian, 
The Proposed Arbitration Provisions in the Recast of Regulation 44/2001, in 2011 CONTEMPORARY 
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 202 (Arthur W. 
Rovine ed., 2012). 
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anti-suit injunction only enjoins the parties—not the foreign court—an 
injunction ordering a party not to continue its lawsuit in a foreign court 
interferes with that court’s jurisdiction.19  The European view is that an 
anti-suit injunction prevents the foreign court from exercising its full power 
to determine if it has jurisdiction and thereby impairs the mutual trust that 
Member State courts owe to each other.20 
A large part of the controversy has concerned whether or not 
arbitration should be completely excluded from the Brussels I Regulation,21 
meaning that the entire arbitral process—from the agreement to the award 
and its consequences—will be outside the scope of the Regulation’s regime 
governing jurisdiction of the courts and recognition and enforcement of 
judgments.  In an earlier case, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had 
ruled that the Brussels Convention, the predecessor to the Regulation, did 
not apply to cases in which arbitration was the principal subject matter of 
the case (e.g., when the issue was the appointment of an arbitrator).22 
The question remained, however, about the scope of the exclusion with 
respect to other situations.  In West Tankers 2009, the ECJ found that 
despite the specific exclusion of arbitration in Article 1(2)(d), sometimes 
arbitration would be governed by the Regulation.23  In that case, one party 
was challenging in an Italian court the validity of an agreement to arbitrate 
in London, and the English court issued an anti-suit injunction to require 
the matter to be resolved in arbitration.24  However, according to the ECJ, 
the anti-suit injunction was improper.25  In its view, the initial jurisdictional 
question before the Italian court of whether there was a valid arbitration 
agreement was incidental to the main claim—in this case a claim for tort 
 
 19  See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶ 28; see also Case 
C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. I-3565, ¶ 27. 
 20  See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶ 30; see also Case 
C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. I-3565, ¶ 28. 
 21  Brussels I, supra note 1. 
 22  See Case C-190/89, Marc Rich & Co. AG v. Società Italiana Impianti PA, 1991 E.C.R. I-03855 
(ruling that proceedings for the appointment of an arbitrator are within the arbitration exclusion and thus 
are not covered by the Brussels Convention).  But cf. Case C-391/95, Van Uden v. Deco-Line, 1998 
E.C.R. 1-07091 (deciding that certain interim procedures in a pending arbitration could fall under the 
Brussels Convention for enforcement purposes). 
 23  See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663. At the time of West 
Tankers 2009, the highest court in the European Union was known as the European Court of Justice (the 
ECJ).  See Information Brochures, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7004/ (last visited Sept. 
18. 2014).  That court is now known as the Court of Justice.  Id.  The Court of Justice of the European 
Union (the CJEU) includes the Court of Justice, the General Court, and a specialized court, the Civil 
Service Tribunal.  Id.  The Court of Justice is still sometimes informally referred to as the ECJ and all 
references to it in this article will be to the ECJ. 
 24  See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶¶ 9-18. 
 25  See id. ¶¶ 28–32. 
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damages.26  The ECJ found that because the tort claim was within the 
Regulation, the “incidental” issue of the arbitration agreement’s validity 
was also within the Regulation.27  In other words, the ECJ determined that 
since the subject matter of West Tankers was the claim for tort damages—
the kind of substantive issue clearly covered by the Regulation—then the 
question of the arbitration agreement’s validity was a preliminary issue 
equally subject to the Regulation.28 
Having reached this core conclusion, the ECJ then found that an anti-
suit injunction by the English Court to prevent the Italian court from ruling 
on the arbitration agreement’s validity was incompatible with Brussels I 
because it would strip the power of the Italian court to rule on its own 
jurisdiction.29  To allow the practice would undermine the trust Member 
States accord to one another’s legal system.30 
The ECJ’s decision was not, in the view of many, consistent with the 
exclusion of arbitration set forth in the Brussels I Regulation.  Various 
stakeholders have steadfastly supported complete exclusion of arbitration 
from Brussels I in order for litigation and arbitration to operate under 
separate legal frameworks.31  However, others have called for the deletion 
of the arbitration exclusion from the Regulation or a partial deletion so that 
arbitration and litigation would both be regulated by the same regime.32  
Finally in 2012, after many proposals and counterproposals, the European 
Parliament and the Council agreed upon the text of a revised Regulation 
known as the Brussels I Recast.33  The Recast as finally adopted contains 
some clarifications concerning how arbitration and litigation interface, but 
 
 26  See id. ¶ 26. 
 27  See id. 
 28  See id.  Somewhat less clear is whether the Italian court’s decision on validity, which the ECJ 
stated was within the scope of the Regulation, would also be enforceable as a judgment under the 
Regulation’s regime.  In a post West Tankers case, an English Court of Appeal said yes.  Navigation Co. 
v. Endesa Generacion SA, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1397 (Eng.).  It held that a Spanish court’s ruling that 
there was no valid arbitration clause was a judgment within the scope of Brussels I and was binding on 
the English court.  See infra text accompanying notes 83–90. 
 29  See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶¶ 26–28. 
 30   See id. ¶ 30. 
 31  The European Parliament, for example, supported complete exclusion of arbitration from Brussels 
I.  See Draft Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament, COM (2010) 748 
final (June 28, 2011) [hereinafter Draft Report], available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
meetdocs/2009_2014/ documents/juri/pr/869/869709/869709en.pdf. 
 32  See, e.g., Burkhard Hess et al., Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member 
States, at 49 (Sept. 2007) [hereinafter Heidelberg Report]; Commission Green Paper on the Review of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM (2009) 175 final (Apr. 21, 2009) [hereinafter 
Commission Green Paper]. 
 33  See Brussels Recast, supra note 7.  Although the Recast Regulation deals with a number of issues 
besides arbitration, this Article will focus on its treatment of arbitration. 
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it continues the complete exclusion of arbitration from the Recast 
Regulation, leaving unresolved the problems of parallel proceedings and 
inconsistent judgments. 
Part II of this Article deals with the background leading to the Brussels 
Recast, including problems and cases that preceded the ECJ’s decision in 
West Tankers 2009, the content and scope of the decision, the controversy 
provoked by the decision, and the EU Commission Proposal in 2010 to try 
to resolve the controversy.  Part III considers issues the Recast Regulation 
may have resolved by means of the extensive explanatory provisions 
contained in Recital 12 (Recital or Recital 12), as well as issues that remain 
unresolved.  Part IV focuses on problems that remain and possible solutions 
going forward, both practical and aspirational.  The need for solutions is 
manifest because the current state of the law regarding parallel proceedings 
in Europe appears to create as many issues as it resolves. 
 
II. BACKGROUND LEADING TO THE RECAST BRUSSELS    
REGULATION 
 
The path leading to the Brussels Recast’s treatment of arbitration was 
at best rocky.  The main question regarding the potential 
arbitration/litigation interface was whether arbitration should be included in 
the Recast at all.  Should the camel’s nose be allowed under the tent?  The 
ECJ took the controversial step of saying yes in West Tankers 2009 when it 
held that an anti-suit injunction in support of arbitration was not permitted 
because it was incompatible with Brussels I.  In response to many different 
strong opinions by various groups regarding the ECJ’s decision, the EU 
Commission undertook a compromise in its 2010 Proposal.  Ultimately, 
however, the Commission Proposal was rejected and the final Brussels 
Recast came up with something else entirely, which will be discussed in 
Part III. 
 
A. Brussels I and the Italian Torpedo 
 
Brussels I provides that once a Member State court is seised of a 
litigated matter, no other Member State court may go forward with the 
same matter until the first court has determined whether it has jurisdiction.34  
 
 34  The court first seised is the first court to receive the claim.  The EU rules on jurisdiction give 
priority to the court first seised.  See Brussels I, supra note 1.  Article 27 (1 & 2) provides: 
1. Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties 
are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the court first 
seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of 
the court first seised is established. 
2. Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any court other than the 
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The result can be what Europeans call a “torpedo action,” which means that 
a party with deliberate intent to delay may race to file the first suit in a 
jurisdiction whose court system is notoriously slow.35  Because in some 
cases the court first seised could take 10 years or more to reach a decision, 
it effectively “torpedoes” any chance for a reasonable or timely resolution 
of the dispute.  The torpedo action is sometimes referred to as the “Italian 
torpedo” because the Italian courts are known to be painfully slow and 
inefficient.36  The court seised second cannot enjoin a party in its court to 
discontinue the action in the inefficient first seised court because under 
Brussels I it must respect the integrity of the other court to correctly decide 
the jurisdictional question.37 
The ECJ held in Turner v. Grovit that even when one party is acting in 
bad faith by bringing a case in another jurisdiction in order to frustrate 
existing proceedings, a court cannot issue an anti-suit injunction to stop the 
bad faith party from maintaining the litigation in another court.38  
According to the ECJ, an anti-suit injunction would limit the power of a 
court to freely assess its own jurisdiction and thereby undermine the mutual 
trust that the Member States accord one another’s legal systems and judicial 
institutions.39  Thus, a court in one Member State cannot limit another 
Member State court’s power to determine the dispute by enjoining the 
parties from litigating before that court.  Therefore, the ECJ established in 
Turner that with respect to litigated matters, the Brussels I Regulation does 
not permit anti-suit injunctions within the European Union.40 
But what about anti-suit injunctions to protect arbitration rather than 
litigation?  One might think that the express exclusion of arbitration found 
in Article 1(2)(d) of the Brussels I Regulation would mean that the 
Regulation provided no authority to bar an injunction whose purpose was to 
protect arbitration.  However, in West Tankers 2009, the ECJ found that an 
anti-suit injunction in support of arbitration was not compatible with the 
 
court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.  
Id. 
 35  See Nielsen, supra note 7, at 594. 
 36  See id.  In discussing Case C-116.02, Erich Gasser GmbH v. Misat Srl, 2003 E.C.R. I-14693, 
Professor Nielsen states, “Due to the inefficiency of the Italian court system, it would probably take 
years for the Italian court to reach a decision on its jurisdiction.”  Id. 
 37  See Brussels I, supra note 1.  This provision of Brussels I (Article 29) made the torpedo action 
possible.  To deal with this problem, revisions in the Recast Regulation provide that in certain 
circumstances if the parties have an exclusive choice-of-court agreement, courts of Member States other 
than the Member State chosen by the parties must stay any proceedings until the court seised on the 
basis of the parties’ agreement declares that it does not have jurisdiction.  See Brussels Recast, supra 
note 7, art. 31 (2)–(4).  This should serve as a disincentive to potential torpedo actions in litigated 
matters where parties have made an exclusive choice-of-court agreement. 
 38  See Case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. I-3565. 
 39  See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶¶ 28–31. 
 40  See Case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. I-3565, ¶¶ 28–31. 
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Regulation.41  In that case, a vessel owned by West Tankers, which had 
been chartered by an Italian company known as Erg Petroli (Erg), collided 
with a jetty in Syracuse, Italy, causing damage.  Erg collected some of its 
damages from its insurers, Allianz and Generali. Then, pursuant to an 
arbitration agreement between Erg and West Tankers, Erg began an 
arbitration in London against West Tankers for damages in excess of its 
insurance policy (Proceeding number 1).  Erg’s insurers in Italy, seeking to 
recover from West Tankers the amount they had paid Erg under the policy, 
brought a claim against West Tankers in an Italian court (Proceeding 
number 2).  West Tankers then asked an English Court to enjoin the 
insurers from taking further steps in the Italian proceeding, arguing that 
because the insurers were subrogated to Erg’s claim, they were also bound 
by the arbitration clause to arbitrate their claims in London (Proceeding 
number 3).  The High Court of England granted the anti-suit injunction 
against the insurers, ordering them to stop the action in the Italian court, 
noting that an injunction to protect arbitration, as opposed to litigation, was 
permissible because arbitration was excluded from the Brussels I 
Regulation.42 
On appeal, the House of Lords shared the view that the injunction 
should be granted but nonetheless referred to the ECJ the question of 
whether an anti-suit injunction to restrain a party from breaching an 
arbitration agreement by commencing litigation in another Member State 
was compatible with the Brussels I Regulation.43  Meanwhile, the 
arbitration in London continued, the insurers were added as co-claimants, 
and in November 2008 the arbitral tribunal issued an award which held and 
declared that West Tankers was not liable to the insurers.44 
In its decision in West Tankers 2009, the ECJ gave three reasons for 
holding that despite the arbitration exclusion, anti-suit injunctions were not 
permitted by the Regulation.45  First, it said that when the subject matter of 
the dispute was clearly within the scope of Brussels I—such as the tort 
damages at issue in the instant case—then the validity of the arbitration 
agreement was only a preliminary issue that was within the jurisdiction of 
the Italian court.46  Second, it held that the court of one Member State did 
 
 41  See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶¶ 28–30, 32, 34. 
 42  West Tankers, Inc. v. SpA, [2005] EWHC (Comm) 454, [2005] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 240 (Eng.). 
 43  West Tankers Inc v. RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA, [2007] UKHL 4, [2007] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 391 ¶¶ 14–15.  The actual question that the House of Lords referred to the ECJ was the following: 
“Is it consistent with EC Regulation 44/2001 for a court of a Member State to make an order to restrain 
a person from commencing or continuing proceedings in another Member State on the ground that such 
proceedings are in breach of an arbitration agreement?”  Id. ¶ 23. 
 44  See West Tankers Inc. v. Allianz SpA, [2011] EWHC (Comm) 829, [6] (Eng.) (describing the 
tribunal award). 
 45  See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663. 
 46  See id. ¶ 26.  In its earlier ruling in Marc Rich, the ECJ said that the subject matter (appointing an 
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not have the right to strip another Member State court of the power to rule 
on its own jurisdiction by ordering a party to abandon an action in that 
court.47  Such a step would be against the mutual trust principle that was at 
the core of the Regulation.48  Third, the consequences of the anti-suit 
injunction would be fundamentally unjust because the enjoined party would 
be “barred from access to the court . . . and would therefore be deprived of 
a form of judicial protection to which it is entitled.”49  The court also 
suggested that its decision was supported by the New York Convention,50 
which provides that a court seised of an action in a case where parties have 
made an arbitration agreement, “will, at the request of one of the parties, 
refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null 
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.”51  The New York 
Convention, however, does not deal with issues of timing or priority.  The 
lack of clarity in some aspects of West Tankers 2009 and the blurring of the 
interface between arbitration and litigation were to become highly debated 
topics in Europe. 
 
B.  Reaction to West Tankers 
 
There was a large and generally negative reaction to West Tankers 
2009 from the arbitration community, particularly the English arbitration 
community.  Increasingly, arbitration generates substantial income for 
arbitral institutions as well as for businesses in arbitration-friendly regimes.  
The ever-growing stakes encourage competition among various institutions 
and venues to be more attractive to parties who want to arbitrate.52  The 
English feared that parties would no longer favor London as an arbitration 
seat if English courts could not enjoin parallel proceedings.53  In fact, it did 
 
arbitrator) was arbitration, so the arbitration exclusion applied.  Case C-190-89, Marc Rich & Co. AG v. 
Società Italiana Impianti PA, 1991 E.C.R. 1-03855.  In Van Uden, the ECJ found that provisional 
measures as such do not concern arbitration, but a wider variety of rights.  So, they are covered under 
the Convention.  Case C-391/95, Van Uden v. Deco-Line, 1998 E.C.R. I-07091.  Here, the ECJ is saying 
that the subject matter of the dispute is not arbitration but tort damages, so arbitration is merely a 
preliminary issue and is therefore covered by the Regulation.  Id. 
 47  See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶ 28. 
 48  See id. ¶ 30. 
 49  Id. ¶ 31. 
 50  See id. ¶ 33. 
 51  New York Convention, supra note 4, art. II, ¶ 3. 
 52  See Illmer, supra note 18, at 646 & n.1  (“Arbitration has become an industry sector generating 
considerable turnover at the preferred arbitration seats around the world,” citing a study that estimated 
“the total value of the fees generated by the main European arbitrations centers not including ad hoc 
arbitrations at around EUR 4 billion per year.”). 
 53  See West Tankers Inc v. RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA, [2007] UKHL 4, [2007] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 391 ¶ 21  (“If the Member States of the European Community are unable to offer a seat of 
arbitration capable of making orders restraining parties from acting in breach of the arbitration 
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not take long for some commentators to opine that if parties were concerned 
about the risk of vexatious parallel proceedings, they should select a 
jurisdiction such as the United States as the seat of their arbitration.54 
At the time of the West Tankers 2009 decision in February 2009, 
however, proposals were already circulating about amending Brussels I 
with respect to a number of areas.55  The Regulation itself required the 
European Commission to present a report on the application of the 
Regulation and possible proposals for adjustments or adaptations within 
five years after its effective date in 2001.56  Somewhat late, the Commission 
presented a report57 and a green paper in 2009,58 which took into 
consideration a number of previously commissioned studies and reports, 
including a 2007 study known as the Heidelberg Report.59  The Heidelberg 
Report advocated as one proposal the abolition of the arbitration exclusion 
and as another the inclusion of some specific rules in the Regulation to deal 
with problems of jurisdiction and recognition of judgments related to 
arbitration.60  This study influenced the Commission, which put forward in 
its Report and Green Paper a number of proposals for discussion.61  There 
were a great many comments from different groups and individuals in 
response to the Green Paper, many of which addressed the question of the 
interface of arbitration with Brussels I.62 
 
agreement, there is no shortage of other states which will.”).  The House of Lords expressed its concern 
about potential elimination of anti-suit injunctions as a concern for loss of arbitrations in Europe 
generally, but it was primarily referring to London.  See id.  Most Member States are civil law countries 
whose courts would not grant anti-suit injunctions in any event.  See Radicati di Brozolo, supra note 18, 
at 430. 
54  See, e.g., Rainier, supra note 14, at 436 (“Indeed, after the ECJ’s decision in West Tankers, the 
United States could potentially become more attractive as a seat of arbitration of parties to transnational 
agreements interested in ensuring that they do not end up litigating their disputes in multiple 
jurisdictions.”). 
 55  See Nielsen, supra note 7, at 586 (describing surveys the EU Commission conducted in the 
Member States between 2004 and 2009 about the application of Brussels I). 
 56  See Brussels I, supra note 1, art. 73. 
 57  See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee on the Application of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
COM (2009) 174 final (Apr. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Report on No 44/2001]. 
 58  See Commission Green Paper, supra note 32. 
 59  See Heidelberg Report, supra note 32. 
 60  See id. § 131 (“[T]he interfaces between the Judgment Regulation [(JR) that is, the Brussels I 
Regulation] and arbitration should be addressed in a more sophisticated way than by the all embracing 
exclusion of arbitration in Article 1(2)(d) JR. In the current discussion, two possible avenues should be 
advocated. The first is to delete Article 1 (2)(d) JR . . . . The second . . . is to address the interfaces 
between arbitration and the Judgment Regulation in a positive, comprehensive way . . . .”). 
 61  See Report on No 44/2001, supra note 57; Commission Green Paper, supra note 32. 
 62  See Illmer, supra note 18, at 657 & n.42 (referring to a list of over 100 contributors at 
ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/news_consulting_0002_en.htm). 
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Many in the arbitration community were quite alarmed by the Green 
Paper proposals.  The concerns were that the extensive regulation of 
arbitration that was proposed would greatly limit the autonomy of Member 
States with respect to arbitration and would jeopardize the body of 
arbitration law of some of the States.63  Moreover, it was believed that the 
proposed amendments would impinge upon courts’ obligations under the 
New York Convention and repudiate the doctrine of competence-
competence.64 
As a general matter, many in the arbitration community wanted to 
keep the arbitration exclusion in the Brussels I Regulation.65  This was the 
very strong proposal of an International Bar Association Working Group.66  
In addition, the European Parliament passed a resolution opposing deletion 
of the arbitration exclusion.67 
Given the robust debate about the interface of arbitration and 
Brussels I, the European Commission decided in June 2010 to appoint an 
international Group of Experts—practitioners and academics—to provide a 
recommendation.68  The recommendation and proposal of the Group of 
Experts, submitted in October 2010, was adopted by the Commission and 
put forth as the Commission Proposal in December 2010.69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 63  See Radicati di Brozolo, supra note 18, at 433–34. 
 64  See id. at 433.  Competence-competence is the doctrine that holds that arbitrators have the 
authority to decide their own jurisdiction.  See infra note 79. 
 65  See Kessedjian, The Proposed Arbitration Provisions in the Recast of Regulation 44/2001, supra 
note 18, at 205 (“[T]hose who are arbitration specialists are mostly opposed to changing the arbitration 
exception unless it is to reinforce it.”). 
66  In its report, the Working Group of the International Bar Association Arbitration Committee concluded 
as follows: “[T]here seems to be no compelling reason for deleting the arbitration exclusion; such a deletion 
would actually adversely affect the effectiveness of arbitration agreements and the circulation of arbitral 
awardsError! Hyperlink reference not valid..”  Submission from the Working Grp. of the Int’l Bar 
Ass’n Arbitration Comm. to the Eur. Comm’n (June 15, 2009), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0002/contributions/civil_society_ngo_ 
academics_others/international_bar_association_arbitration_committee_en.pdf. 
 67  The Parliamentary Resolution dealt with many different aspects of the implementation of Brussels 
I, but with respect to arbitration it provided that it “[s]trongly opposes the (even partial) abolition of the 
exclusion of arbitration from the scope.”  Resolution on Implementation and Review of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, PARL. EUR. DOC. (COM 0304) 9 (2010). 
 68  See Illmer, supra note 18, at 657. 
 69  See id. 
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C.  The Commission Proposal of 201070 
 
The Commission Proposal offered a compromise.  The arbitration 
exclusion in the Brussels I Regulation would remain but with a limited 
exception.  Article 29(4) of the proposed Recast Regulation provided as 
follows: 
 
Where the agreed or designated seat of an arbitration is in a 
Member State, the courts of another Member State whose 
jurisdiction is contested on the basis of an arbitration agreement 
shall stay proceedings once the courts of the Member State where 
the seat of the arbitration is located or the arbitral tribunal have 
been seised of proceedings to determine, as their main object or 
as an incidental question, the existence, validity or effects of that 
arbitration agreement. 
 
This paragraph does not prevent the court whose jurisdiction 
is contested from declining jurisdiction in the situation referred to 
above if its national law so prescribes. 
 
Where the existence, validity or effects of the arbitration 
agreement are established, the court seised shall decline 
jurisdiction. 
 
This paragraph does not apply in disputes concerning 
matters referred to in Sections 3, 4, and 5 of Chapter II.71 
 
Thus, the preferred court for jurisdictional purposes would be the court 
of the Member State at the seat of arbitration or the arbitral tribunal once 
either one was seised of proceedings.  This would be true even if an action 
had been commenced earlier in another Member State court.72  Once 
arbitration or a court action was commenced in the seat, any other Member 
State court whose jurisdiction was challenged based on the arbitration 
agreement would have to stay proceedings.73  Moreover, once the existence, 
 
 70  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), COM (2010) 748 
final (Dec. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Commission Proposal]. 
 71  Id. The carve-out from the proposed regulation contained in this last sentence pertains to 
insurance (Section 3), consumers (Section 4) and employment (Section 5). 
 72  See Illmer, supra note 18, at 661 (“[I]t is not the court seised first in time that is exclusively 
competent to determine the arbitration agreement’s validity but, regardless of timing, the seat court or 
alternatively the arbitral tribunal.”). 
 73  See Commission Proposal, supra note 70, art. 29(4). 
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validity, or effect of the arbitration agreement was established in the seat, 
the foreign court would have to decline jurisdiction.  This kind of rule is 
known as a lis pendens rule.74 
The Commission Proposal was seen as a positive development by 
many because it basically retained the arbitration exclusion, except for the 
lis pendens rule.  By deferring to the parties’ choice of the seat as the 
jurisdiction that would decide whether the arbitration agreement was valid, 
it offered a reasonable solution to the torpedo problem.  There would now 
be a substantial disincentive for a party to file suit in another country 
because the non-seat court would have to stay the action and potentially 
decline jurisdiction.  The lis pendens rule would likely discourage parties 
from filing parallel proceedings simply to delay and harass or to torpedo the 
other party because the non-seat litigation would simply not go forward. 
In addition to Article 29(4), the Proposal provided in Article 33(3) a 
rule specifying when an arbitral tribunal would be deemed seised for 
purposes of the lis pendens rule: “an arbitral tribunal is deemed to be seised 
when a party has nominated an arbitrator or when a party has requested the 
support of an institution, authority or court for the tribunal’s constitution.”75  
This was a less appropriate change because it was not consistent with some 
of the international rules, such as Article 21 of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration, which provides as follows: 
“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral proceedings in respect 
of a particular dispute commence on the date on which a request for that 
dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent.”76 
The Commission Proposal generally found support, however, because 
the lis pendens rule along with the definition of “seised” were the only 
provisions pertaining to arbitration that would be part of the Recast 
Brussels Regulation if the Proposal were adopted.  National law would 
govern any other arbitration matters.  Moreover, the Proposal seemed to 
offer a very reasonable solution even it was not a perfect one.  It largely 
kept arbitration out of the Regulation and yet resolved the problem of the 
torpedo action.  In his thorough and insightful article on the Proposal, 
Professor Luca Radicati di Brozolo concluded, “The Proposal is overall a 
satisfactory compromise to the quandary of the interface between 
arbitration and the European jurisdictional space.”77 
 
 
 74  Lis Pendens Definition, FREE DICTIONARY BY FARLEX, http://legal-dictionary.thefree 
dictionary.com/lis+pendens (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).  “Lis pendens” is Latin for “suit pending.”  Id. 
 75   See Commission Proposal, supra note 70, art. 33(3). 
 76  U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION, art. 21, U.N. Sales No. E.95.V.18 (1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 1985], 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/06-54671_Ebook.pdf. 
 77  Radicati di Brozolo, supra note 18, at 460. 
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The Proposal seemed generally acceptable to many in the arbitration 
community.  For example, the Arbitration Committee of the International 
Bar Association (IBA) found the Proposal substantially in line with the 
IBA’s recommendations that had been submitted earlier in response to the 
Green Paper.78  It noted that the Proposal made clear that arbitration was 
generally excluded from the Regulation and that Article 29(4) would not 
prevent a court from declining jurisdiction when there was prima facie an 
arbitration agreement and when a country admitted the negative effect of 
competence-competence.79  The IBA Arbitration Committee concluded that 
if adopted, the Proposal “would be a major development in favour of 
arbitration.”80 
There were others, however, including some in the arbitration 
community, who did not want the camel to put his nose under the tent.  
They feared that any reference to arbitration in the Recast Regulation, other 
than the arbitration exclusion, might permit a court to rule on some further 
issues that it found to be arbitration related just as the ECJ had done in West 
Tankers.81  In particular, the Legislative Action Committee (LAC) of the 
European Parliament maintained its very strong opposition to including any 
mention of arbitration issues in Brussels I.82  In its Draft Report in June 
2011, LAC maintained that there should be an absolute exclusion of 
arbitration from the Recast Regulation on the grounds that arbitration is 
“satisfactorily dealt with” by the New York Convention and the 1961 
 
 78  See Changes to Brussels Regulation – Dec 2010 Update, INT’L BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Dispute_Resolution_Section/Arbitration/Projects.aspx [hereinafter Changes 
to Brussels Regulation] (last visited Sept. 20, 2014). 
79  See id.  Competence-competence is a widely followed doctrine in international arbitration that 
holds that an arbitral tribunal is competent to determine its own competence.  That is, it has the power to 
determine whether it has jurisdiction.  See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 1019 (2014).  The negative effect of competence-competence is that in certain countries, 
such as France, courts cannot in most instances make the decision about arbitrator competence, but must 
defer to the arbitral tribunal, which will determine in the first instance whether it has jurisdiction.  Id.  
The French Code of Civil Procedure, Article 1448 provides that “when a dispute subject to an 
arbitration agreement is brought before a court, such court shall decline jurisdiction except if an arbitral 
tribunal has not yet been seised of the dispute and if the arbitration agreement is manifestly void or 
manifestly inapplicable.”  Id. at 1111 n.356.  The meaning of manifestly void or manifestly inapplicable 
has been narrowly interpreted by the French courts.  SANDRA SYNKOVÀ, COURTS’ INQUIRY INTO 
ARBITRAL JURISDICTION AT THE PRE-AWARD STAGE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ENGLISH, 
GERMAN AND SWISS LEGAL ORDER 89–90 (2013). Gary Born notes that case law on the subject has 
been codified by Article 1455 of the revised French Code.  BORN, supra note 79, at 1113.  Article 1455 
provides, “If an arbitration agreement is manifestly void or manifestly not applicable, the judge acting in 
support of the arbitration shall declare that no appointment [of an arbitrator] need be made.”  Id. at 1112 
n.360. 
 80  See Changes to Brussels Regulation, supra note 78. 
 81  See Radicati di Brozolo, supra note 18, at 457–58. 
 82  See Draft Report, supra note 31. 
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Geneva Convention on International Commercial Arbitration.83  In the same 
month, the Council of Justice and Home Affairs (the Council) also 
approved a deletion of Article 29(4) and provided a more extensive 
amendment to the explanatory recital, which became Recital 12 in the 
Recast Regulation.84  Thus, neither the proposed Article 33(3) nor the 
proposed lis pendens rule in Article 29(4) was ultimately included in the 
Recast Brussels Regulation.85 
After extensive negotiations among EU institutions, governments, and 
various stakeholders, the Recast Brussels Regulation was approved in 
December 2012.86  The end result was far different from the original 
proposals by the European Commission in its Green Paper and from the 
carefully constructed compromise in the Commission Proposal of 
December 2010, which was rejected by the Parliament and the Council. 
 
III.  BRUSSELS I RECAST 
 
In the text of the Recast Regulation, the arbitration exclusion remains 
the same as in Brussels I.  The only changes are (1) the extensive Recital 
12, which attempts to explain how the arbitration exclusion should be 
understood in relation to the Brussels I Regulation, and (2) a new Article 
73(2), which specifically provides that the Brussels I Regulation shall not 
affect the application of the 1958 New York Convention.  The four 
paragraphs of Recital 12, which will be discussed below, make clear that 
parallel proceedings in arbitration and litigation will continue, that a court’s 
decision on the validity of an arbitration agreement cannot come within the 
Recast Regulation even if it is a preliminary question, that the New York 
Convention has primacy over the Recast with respect to questions of 
enforcement, and that no ancillary proceedings relating to arbitration are 
within the Recast’s scope.87  The exclusion of arbitration from the Recast 
 
83  Id. at 48. The Committee simply deleted Article 29(4) and somewhat expanded the explanation in 
Recital 11 (which was redrafted by the Council to become Recital 12 in the Recast Regulation).  Id.  The 
Report was incorrect, however, as to all Members of the European Union being parties to the Geneva 
Convention.  A number are not.  For example, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Portugal, and the 
Netherlands, among other countries, are not parties to the Geneva Convention.  See Chapter XXII 
Commercial Arbitration: European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, UNITED 
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no 
=XXII-2&chapter=22& lang=en (last updated Oct. 12, 2014) (providing a list of the thirty-one adherents). 
 84  See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast) - First 
Reading - General Approach, 10609/12 JUSTCIV209 CODEC 1495 ADD 1 (showing the deletion of 
Article 29(4) of the Commission’s Proposal, and in footnote 1 to Article 84, the Recital that was to 
become Recital 12 in the Recast Regulation). 
 85  See Brussels Recast, supra note 7. 
 86  See id. 
 87  Although a recital is not an operative provision of the legislation, in European law if an operative 
_JD_Moses Final Read_2.7.15.docx (DO NOT  DELETE) 3/12/15  7:51 AM 
Arbitration/Litigation Interface 
35:1 (2014) 
19 
Regulation’s regime remains intact, but there is much to be learned from 
the explanatory Recital. 
 
A.  Recital 12, Paragraph 1: Permitting Parallel Proceedings 
 
Even though arbitration is excluded from the scope of the Recast, the 
drafters of Recital 12 wanted to help courts and parties understand how this 
exclusion would actually work.  The first paragraph of Recital 12 clarifies 
that a court’s decision regarding an arbitration agreement will not be 
governed by the jurisdictional rules under the Recast Regulation.  The 
paragraph provides that when any court is seised of a matter regarding 
which the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement, nothing in the 
Recast Regulation will prevent that court from the following: (1) referring 
the parties to arbitration, (2) staying or dismissing the proceedings, or 
(3) examining whether the arbitration agreement is null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed in accordance with national 
law.88 
Thus, when a court is first seised by a matter where an arbitration 
agreement has been alleged, this does not require a second court to await its 
decision on jurisdiction.  Proceedings in the two courts can go forward 
simultaneously.  Therefore, parallel proceedings cannot prevent one court 
from acting because the other court was first seised. 
Of course, in West Tankers 2009 the arbitration tribunal was always 
free to continue its proceedings because arbitration is excluded from the 
Brussels I Regulation.  But even though the ECJ in West Tankers focused 
on whether an anti-suit injunction to protect arbitration was permissible, its 
decision appeared to be more far-reaching.  It indicated that once the Italian 
court decided the validity of the arbitration agreement then, because the 
jurisdictional question was a preliminary issue related to the substance of 
the dispute, both came within the scope of the Regulation.89  The logical 
consequence appeared to be that the English court would be bound by the 
Italian court’s decision on the validity of the arbitration agreement.  That is 
how the Court of Appeal in London interpreted West Tankers 2009 in a 
subsequent case, National Navigation Co. v. Endesa Generacion SA 
(Endesa).  Relying on its understanding of West Tankers 2009, the Court of 
Appeal in London held that a Spanish court’s finding that an arbitration 
agreement was invalid would bind the English court under the Regulation.90 
 
provision is ambiguous, it is interpreted in light of the recital.  See, e.g., Tadas Klimas & Jurate 
Vaiciukaite, The Law of Recitals in European Community Legislation, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 61, 
73 (2008). 
 88  Brussels Recast, supra note 7, Recital 12, ¶ 1. 
 89  Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶¶ 22, 26, 27. 
 90  Navigation Co. v. Endesa Generacion SA, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1397 (Eng.).  However, not all 
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B.  Recital 12, Paragraph 2:  Reversing Endesa 
 
Whether or not Endesa was correctly decided by the English court, 
paragraph 2 of Recital 12 makes clear that under the Recast such an 
interpretation would be incorrect.  In Endesa, there was a dispute over late 
delivery for goods that were not delivered to the proper contractual point of 
discharge as required by the bill of lading.91  Endesa, a Spanish energy 
company, initiated an action for damages in a Spanish court.  National 
Navigation Co., an Egyptian shipping company, initiated in the English 
court a court action claiming a declaration of nonliability; however, in the 
Spanish court, National Navigation sought a declaration that an arbitration 
clause had been incorporated into the bill of lading.92  It subsequently 
commenced an arbitration proceeding in London.  The Spanish court found 
under Spanish law that the bill of lading did not incorporate the arbitration 
clause.93  Thus, the question arose before the English Court of Appeal 
whether the Spanish court’s ruling that there was no valid arbitration clause 
was a judgment within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation (which must 
be recognized by the English court).94 
The English court held that although the proceedings in the Spanish 
court concerned arbitration, the Spanish judgment was a Regulation 
judgment and was binding on the English court.95  This effectively 
terminated the arbitration.  Even if the Spanish judgment was arguably not 
directly binding on the arbitral tribunal in London,96 any arbitral award 
 
commentators agree that the English Court of Appeal correctly interpreted West Tankers on this point.  
See, e.g., Vesna Lazić, The Commission’s Proposal to Amend the Arbitration Exception in the EC 
Jurisdiction Regulation: How ‘Much Ado about Nothing’ Can End Up in a ‘Comedy of Errors’ and in 
Anti-suit Injunctions Brussels-style, 29 J. of INT’L ARB. 20, 24 (2012) (asserting that the English court 
reached “an obviously incorrect conclusion” because “a decision on the validity of an arbitration itself 
falls outside the scope of the Regulation”(internal citations omitted)). 
 91  Navigation Co. v. Endesa Generacion SA, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1397, ¶ 1 (Eng.). 
 92  Id. ¶¶ 1–2. 
 93  Id. ¶ 8(xiii). 
 94  Id. ¶ 5. 
 95  See id. ¶¶ 59, 69, 119, 123. 
 96  Some courts consider that a foreign judgment would bind an arbitral tribunal. For example, in the 
Endesa decision, Lord Justice Moore-Bick stated in dicta as follows: 
It is quite true that the Regulation itself does not apply to arbitral tribunals and that 
arbitrators are not therefore bound by the Regulations themselves to recognize judgments 
of the courts of Member States of the EU, but it does not follow that foreign judgments, 
whether of the courts of Member States or other countries, can be disregarded in 
arbitration proceedings. A judgment of a foreign court which is regarded under English 
conflicts of laws rules as having jurisdiction and which is final and conclusive on the 
merits is entitled to recognition at common law . . . . It follows, therefore, that arbitrators 
applying English law are bound to give effect to that rule. There is nothing new in this; it 
has long been recognized that a judgment of a foreign court can give rise to estoppel by 
res judicata . . . – and the principle is routinely applied in arbitration proceedings.   
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against the Spanish defendant would no doubt be vacated by an English 
court because the Spanish decision holding there was no right to arbitrate 
had been held to be binding.  Certainly, any attempt by a claimant to 
enforce in Spain an award granted in these circumstances would be futile. 
The Endesa holding, however, appears to be reversed by the language 
in Recital 12, which provides as follows: 
 
A ruling given by a court of a Member State as to whether or not 
an arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable 
of being performed should not be subject to the rules of 
recognition and enforcement laid down in this Regulation, 
regardless of whether the court decided on this as a principal 
issue or as an incidental question.97 
 
Thus, the Recast Regulation makes clear that a court’s decision on the 
validity of an arbitration agreement is not subject to the Recast Regulation’s 
recognition and enforcement rules even when it is an incidental question 
related to the substance of a dispute within the scope of the Recast.  This 
means that in a situation like Endesa the English court would not be bound 
by the Spanish court’s decision and could make its own independent 
decision as to whether there was a valid arbitration agreement.  This results 
in autonomy for national courts with respect to determining the validity of 
arbitration agreements but also in a higher risk of inconsistent decisions.  
The resulting inconsistent decision will, of course, raise the question of 
what law governs the enforcement of those decisions.  What is the relation 
between rules of enforcement under the Recast and under the New York 
Convention? 
 
C.  Recital 12, Paragraph 3:  Giving Primacy to the New York 
Convention 
 
 Paragraph 3 of Recital 12 tries to help answer this enforcement 
question.  Assuming that inconsistent decisions will result when, for 
example, an arbitral tribunal in one jurisdiction issues an arbitration award 
finding the respondent liable while a court in another jurisdiction issues a 
judgment finding no liability, what happens next?  The Recast Regulation 
provides that once a court has determined that the arbitration agreement is 
not valid, it can render a judgment on the substance of the dispute (i.e., the 
merits) that should be recognized and enforced in accordance with the 
 
Id. ¶ 118. 
 97  Brussels Recast, supra note 7, Recital 12, ¶ 2. 
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Regulation.98  However, assuming an inconsistent arbitration award dealing 
with the same matter has also been issued in another jurisdiction, that award 
may be enforceable under the New York Convention.  While Article 73(2) 
of the Recast Regulation provides that the Regulation “shall not affect the 
application of the 1958 New York Convention,” it does not specifically 
give the New York Convention primacy over the Recast.99  However, 
Recital 12 clearly states that the New York Convention takes precedence 
over the Recast.100 
Nonetheless, for a court looking for reasons not to enforce, there is a 
possible though not very persuasive argument that although Recital 12 says 
that the New York Convention takes precedence over the Recast 
Regulation, the statement has no operative effect because it is not contained 
in the operative provisions.101  Scholars assert, however, that a clear recital 
in European legislation controls an ambiguous operative provision, such 
that the operative provision will be interpreted in light of the recital.102  
Thus, because Article 73(2) of the Recast Regulation is not clear on its face 
about whether the New York Convention or the Regulation has priority, the 
provision should be interpreted in light of Recital 12, which gives the New 
York Convention precedence. 
However, if the claimant tries to enforce its award at the enforcing 
court, where the assets of the respondent can be found, that court is likely to 
be in the home country of the respondent and is also likely to be the same 
court where the respondent brought suit.  Thus, that same court would have 
already found that there was no arbitration agreement and that the 
defendant or respondent had no liability.  As a result, there may be some 
question whether such a court would go against its own decision and 
enforce the inconsistent arbitral award under the New York Convention.  
The court might try to find reasons not to enforce, such as public policy.  
However, the public policy basis for non-enforcement of an arbitration 
 
 98  Id. ¶ 3 (“[W]here a court of a Member State, exercising jurisdiction under this Regulation or 
under national law, has determined that an arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed, this should not preclude that court’s judgment on the substance of the 
matter from being recognized or, as the case may be, enforced in accordance with this Regulation.”). 
 99  See id. art. 73(2).  Not all Member State courts believe the Convention has primacy over the 
Convention. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 151–55 (describing the Supreme Court of 
Lithuania’s position that the Brussels I Regulation should take precedence over the New York 
Convention). 
 100  Id. Recital 12, ¶ 3 (“[The obligation to enforce a judgment] should be without prejudice to the 
competence of the courts of the Member States to decide on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards in accordance with the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards . . . which takes pre-cedence over this Regulation”). 
 101  Cf. Klimas & Vaiciukaite, supra note 87, at 92 (concluding that “[w]here the recital is clear, it 
will control an ambiguous operative provision”). 
 102  Id. at 92. 
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award under the New York Convention has been interpreted narrowly.103 
Although one can only speculate about likely results when courts are 
faced with conflicting decisions, it is evident that when the European Union 
rejected the European Commission proposal for giving jurisdictional 
preference to the seat of arbitration, it created a range of potential factors 
and outcomes that can serve to complicate arbitration proceedings and 
enforcement.  Nonetheless, the Recast Regulation is helpful in identifying 
what is not within its scope as will be discussed below with respect to 
ancillary proceedings. 
 
D.  Recital 12, Paragraph 4:  No Ancillary Proceedings Within the 
Scope of the Brussels Recast 
 
1.  The Content of Ancillary Proceedings 
 
In addition to various points discussed above based on paragraphs 1 
through 3 of Recital 12, in paragraph 4 the Recital makes clear that 
ancillary proceedings—that is, court proceedings connected with 
arbitration—are not subject to the Recast Regulation’s regime. 
The Regulation should not apply to any actions or ancillary 
proceedings relating to, in particular, the establishment of an arbitral 
tribunal; the powers of arbitrators; the conduct of an arbitration procedure 
or any other aspects of such a procedure; or to any action or judgment 
concerning the annulment, review, appeal, recognition, or enforcement of 
an arbitral award.104 
Thus, some of the typical interactions of a court with an arbitration 
proceeding, such as establishing a tribunal105 or reviewing a tribunal’s claim 
of jurisdiction,106 are not subject to the Recast Regulation.  Moreover, when 
 
 103  See, e.g., Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft M.B.H. (D.S.T.) v. Ras Al Khaimah 
Nat’l Oil Co. (Rakoil), [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 246, 257 (C.A.) (Eng.) (stating that in order to set aside an 
award on public policy grounds a party must prove “some element of illegality or that the enforcement 
of the award would be clearly injurious to the public good . . .”); see also Thales Air Defence v. 
Euromissile et al., Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., Nov. 18, 2004, REV. ARB., 
2005, 751 (Fr.) (stating that a violation of public policy must be “flagrant, effective and concrete” in 
order to be sanctioned). But cf. infra text accompanying notes 142–43 (discussing how Lithuania’s 
Court of Appeal refused to enforce an award that amounted to an anti-suit injunction). 
 104  Brussels Recast, supra note 7, Recital 12, ¶ 4. 
 105  See Case C-190-89, Marc Rich & Co. AG v. Società Italiana Impianti PA, 1991 E.C.R. I-03855. 
 106  See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 1985, supra note 76, art. 16(3) (providing that an arbitral 
tribunal’s decision that it has jurisdiction may be reviewed by a court within thirty days). The Model 
Law has been adopted in over sixty-five countries, as well as in a number of territories, provinces, and 
states in the United States.  See Status UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
(1985), with amendments as adopted in 2006, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html [hereinafter Status UNCITRAL Model 
Law] (last visited Oct. 12, 2014). 
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a court vacates an arbitral award or when it recognizes and enforces an 
award, no other Member State is required by the Recast to recognize and 
enforce that court’s judgment.  Nonetheless, because all Member States are 
subject to the New York Convention, this should lead toward some 
convergence of recognition and enforcement standards.107  It is less likely, 
however, that there will be convergence of acceptance of anti-suit 
injunctions as ancillary proceedings. 
 
2.  Anti-suit Injunctions as Ancillary Proceedings 
 
The broad language above stating that “[t]he Regulation should not 
apply to any actions or ancillary proceedings” may give some hope to those 
who would like to see the anti-suit injunction reinstated to protect 
arbitration.  After all, the ECJ’s main logical argument against anti-suit 
injunctions in the West Tankers 2009 decision is somewhat undercut by 
Recital 12.  The ECJ anchored its decision in West Tankers 2009 on the 
theory that since the subject matter of the dispute fell within the scope of 
the Regulation, a preliminary issue such as the validity of the arbitration 
agreement was also within the Regulation’s scope.108  Thus, according to 
the court, the use of an anti-suit injunction to resolve a jurisdictional dispute 
would strip the foreign court of the power the Regulation gave it under 
 
107  In any event, international practice is not consistent on enforcement of awards.  The courts of 
some jurisdictions will in certain circumstances enforce an award that has been set aside (i.e., vacated) 
in another jurisdiction.  In addition, internationally, an award may be enforced in one jurisdiction and 
refused enforcement in another.  See, e.g., Société Hilmarton Ltd. v. Société OTV, Cour de cassation 
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], Mar. 23, 1994, YB Comm. Arb. 1995, XX, 663 (Fr.); La 
Direction Générale de L’Aviation Civile de l’Émirat de Dubaï v. Société International Bechtel Co., Cour 
d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., Sept. 29, 2005 (Fr.); see also Corporación 
Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex-Exploración Y Producción, No. 10 
Civ. 206 (AKH), 2013 WL 4517225, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2013) (confirming an award under the 
Panama Convention nullified in Mexico because the nullification violated the United States’ basic 
notions of justice); Mike McClure, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards That Have Been Set Aside at the 
Seat: The Consistently Inconsistent Approach Across Europe, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (June 26, 2012), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/06/26/enforcement-of-arbitral-awards-that-have-been-set-
aside-at-the-seat-the-consistently-inconsistent-approach-across-europe/ (stating that Paris and the 
Netherlands have recognized such awards while England and Germany tend to take the view that once 
an award is annulled at the seat, the court cannot recognize or enforce it).  In addition, internationally, an 
award may be enforced in one jurisdiction and refused enforcement in another.  See Dallah Real Estate 
& Tourism Holding Co. v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Gov’t of Pak., [2010] UKSC 46, [2011] Bus. 
L.R. 158 (stating that an award made in France was refused enforcement in the United Kingdom but 
subsequently enforced in France); see also George A. Bermann, The U.K Supreme Court Speaks to 
International Arbitration: Learning from the Dallah Case, 22 AM. REV. INT’L  ARB. 1, 4 (2011); Maxi 
Scherer, Effects of Foreign Judgments Relating to International Arbitral Awards: Is the ‘Judgment 
Route’ the Wrong Road, 4 J. INT’L DISP. RESOL. 587 (2013). 
 108  Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶ 26. 
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Article 5(3)109 of the Regulation to rule on its own jurisdiction.110 
However, Brussels Recast makes clear that any ruling on jurisdiction 
arising out of a challenge based on the existence of an arbitration agreement 
“regardless of whether the court decided on this as a principal issue or as an 
incidental question”111 is not subject to rules laid down in the Recast.112  
Thus, if the ruling on jurisdiction is not within the scope of the Recast 
Regulation, it is arguable that an anti-suit injunction pertaining to the ruling 
on jurisdiction is also not subject to the Recast.  Such a step would appear 
to be an “ancillary proceeding” related to an arbitration procedure, to which 
the Recast Regulation should not apply.113 
Nonetheless, because most civil law courts and practitioners object to 
the use of anti-suit injunctions,114 if the issue goes back to the ECJ the 
possibility that anti-suit injunctions would be reinstated as a mechanism to 
protect arbitration is probably small.  The Advocate General, Kokott, whose 
opinion was largely followed by the ECJ in West Tankers 2009, noted the 
following: 
 
[A] unilateral anti-suit injunction is not, however, a suitable 
measure to rectify [jurisdiction in two courts].  In particular, if 
other member states were to follow the English example and also 
introduce anti-suit injunctions, reciprocal injunctions would 
ensue.  Ultimately the jurisdiction which could impose higher 
penalties for failure to comply with the injunction would 
prevail.115 
 
Similarly, Professor Radicati di Brozolo stated, “[G]iven that the same 
game can be played by different players, the liberty to resort to anti-suit 
injunctions is a recipe for chaos . . . .”116 
 
 109  Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation provides as follows: “A person domiciled in a Member 
State may, in another Member State, be sued . . . in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the 
courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.”  Brussels I, supra note 1, art. 5(3). 
 110  See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶¶ 27–28. 
 111  Brussels Recast, supra note 7, Recital 12, ¶ 2. 
 112  Id. 
 113  See id. 
 114  See, e.g., Radicati di Brozolo, supra note 18, at 430 (“[S]ince  anti-suit injunctions are used 
almost only by courts in the United Kingdom and Ireland, allowing them would be tantamount to 
condoning what is viewed elsewhere as an imperialistic and condescending policy . . . .”).  Professor 
Radicati di Brozolo acknowledged, however, that “the courts in the United Kingdom are cautious about 
granting anti-suit injunctions or interdicts and seek to be respectful of comity.”  Id. at 430 n.30. 
 115  Case C-185/07, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Allianz SpA and Others v. West Tankers 
Inc. ¶ 72, CURIA (Sept. 4, 2008), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang 
=EN&text= &pageIndex=0&docid=66648&cid=286938. 
 116  Radicati di Brolozo, supra note 18, at 432. 
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3.  Issuance of Anti-suit Injunctions by Arbitrators 
 
However, even if anti-suit injunctions by courts are found to be 
impermissible, it may be that arbitrators can issue a form of anti-suit 
injunction.  Under the Recast Regulation, inconsistent judgments will occur 
with no ready remedy given the lack of the kind of lis pendens rule that the 
Commission Proposal had provided and without the possibility of a court-
issued anti-suit injunction.  In light of this, arbitral tribunals may fashion 
their own remedies.  Even if the Brussels Recast were interpreted to prevent 
courts from issuing anti-suit injunctions, it does not appear that arbitral 
tribunals are covered by this prohibition.  Some arbitral laws and rules as 
well as arbitral practice support the power of arbitrators “to take any 
appropriate measures either to avoid the aggravation of the dispute or to 
ensure the effectiveness of their future award.”117  Article 26 of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, for example, provides that a tribunal may 
grant an order to prevent harm to the arbitral process: 
 
1. The arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, grant 
interim measures. 
 
2. An interim measure is any temporary measure by which, at any 
time prior to the issuance of the award by which the dispute is 
finally decided, the arbitral tribunal orders a party, for example, 
and without limitation, to . . . 
 
(b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking 
action that is likely to cause, (i) current or imminent harm or 
(ii) prejudice to the arbitral process itself . . . .118 
 
 117  Emmanuel Gaillard, Anti-suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitrators, in INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 2006: BACK TO BASICS? 235, 236–37 (Albert Jan van den Berg, ed., 2006).  Mr. Gaillard, 
a lawyer trained in the civil law tradition, points out that arbitrators’ jurisdiction to issue anti-suit 
injunctions is confirmed by international arbitration practice, citing numerous cases in commercial 
arbitration, investment arbitration, and the Iran Claims Tribunal where tribunals have issued anti-suit 
injunctions. Id. at 244–59.  He also notes that “[a]rbitral case law shows that arbitral tribunals have 
repeatedly recognized their power to award damages for the breach by a party of its undertaking to 
arbitrate its dispute . . . .”  Id. at 238. 
 118  U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES [hereinafter UNCITRAL 
ARBITRATION RULES], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-
revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf.  Moreover, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration as amended in 2006 contains identical language in Article 17(2).  See U.N. COMM’N 
ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
[hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 2006], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/ 
english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf.  Additionally, under the ICC Rules of Arbitration 
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Thus, under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules a tribunal could 
conclude that a party who was starting litigation in another jurisdiction in 
violation of an arbitration agreement was causing harm or prejudice to the 
arbitral process and order the party to withdraw from that litigation.  Such 
an order could have the same effect as an anti-suit injunction. 
The Iran–United States Claims Tribunal, which adopted the 
UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration with some adjustments, used this 
provision to good effect.119  One tribunal, which had ordered Iran to request 
a stay in Iranian court litigation because of the arbitration before the 
tribunal, noted, “This Tribunal has an inherent power to issue such orders as 
may be necessary to conserve the respective rights of the Parties and to 
ensure that this Tribunal’s jurisdiction and authority are made fully 
effective.”120  There were in fact a number of cases in which a tribunal 
ordered a party to stay duplicative proceedings in an Iranian court.121 
It could be argued that a tribunal-issued order would not be as 
effective as an anti-suit injunction because the tribunal does not have the 
coercive powers available to a court, which can impose penalties such as 
contempt of court or fines.122  However, there may be lessons to be learned 
from a 2012 iteration of West Tankers (West Tankers 2012) where the 
English High Court held that an arbitral tribunal should have awarded 
damages to West Tankers.123  West Tankers had asked the arbitral tribunal 
to award it damages against the respondent-insurers for their breach of the 
arbitration agreement, as well as an indemnity to cover any potential 
liability that might be found by the Italian court.124  The arbitral tribunal, in 
a 2-1 decision, had reluctantly asserted it could not do so based on its belief 
that such an award was prohibited by the ECJ’s interpretation of Brussels I 
in West Tankers 2009.125  According to the arbitrators, the ECJ had 
concluded in West Tankers 2009 that a party had a fundamental right to 
 
28(1), the arbitral tribunal may order “any interim or conservatory measure it deems appropriate.” This 
provides the tribunal with “the broadest possible power, including the power to order anti-suit injunctions.” 
Christian Aschauer, Use of the ICC Emergency Arbitrator to Protect the Arbitral Proceedings, 23 ICC INT’L 
CT. OF ARB. BULL. 5, 7 (2012). 
 119  See DAVID D. CARON & LEE M. CAPLAN, THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES 518 n.24 (2d 
ed. 2013). 
 120  Laurent Lévy, Anti-suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitrators, in ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 115, 119 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 2005) (citing from the Feb 4, 1983 
Interim Award in Case No. 338, E-Systems, Inc. v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 51, 57 (1983)). 
 121  See id. 
 122  Court-imposed penalties for failing to comply with an anti-suit injunction can be significant.  
See, e.g., Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial Ltda. v. GE Medical Systems Info. Techs., Inc., 369 F. 
3d 645, 649 (2d Cir. 2004) (ordering a noncomplying party to pay U.S. $1000 per day for the first three 
months and $5000 per day subsequently until it complied). 
 123  West Tankers Inc v. Allianz SpA & Anor, [2012] EWHC (Comm) 854. 
 124  See id. ¶ 25. 
 125  See id. ¶¶ 23–25 (discussion by the High Court). 
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bring proceedings under Article 5(3) of the Regulation, and to deny that 
right would be to undermine the principle of effective judicial protection.126  
Therefore, the tribunal found it did not have the right to impose damages on 
a party that was simply seeking to assert its fundamental right.127 
The English High Court disagreed.128  Mr. Justice Flaux noted 
specifically that the Advocate General (AG), with whom the ECJ had not 
disagreed in West Tankers 2009, acknowledged that because arbitration was 
outside the scope of Brussels I, courts and tribunals would be able to issue 
inconsistent decisions.129  Because the AG had expressly recognized that a 
tribunal could issue a different decision from that of a court, Mr. Justice 
Flaux found there was no basis to conclude that the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
was circumscribed by the Regulation as to the kinds of decisions it could 
make.130  An award granting damages for breach of an arbitration clause, as 
well as an indemnity, was simply a logical extension of the tribunal’s basic 
award.131 
Thus, Mr. Justice Flaux concluded that the arbitrators could grant the 
remedy sought by West Tankers. He stated: 
 
[G]iven that [the A.G.] recognises that one effect of her Opinion 
would be that an arbitral tribunal could reach a different decision 
from that of the court “first seised,” both as to the scope and 
effectiveness of the agreement to arbitrate and as to the overall 
merits, it seems to me impossible for the Respondents to contend 
that her “philosophy” was that the arbitral tribunal would be 
circumscribed in the jurisdiction it could exercise by the 
provisions of the Regulation.132 
 
 
126  The principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of EC law stemming from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States.  See Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable 
of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 5 E.C.R. 1651, ¶¶ 18–19 (1986).  Member States must establish a 
system of legal remedies to ensure that individual rights under EC law can be enforced.  See Case C-
50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. I-06677, ¶ 41. 
 127  See West Tankers Inc v. Allianz SpA & Anor, [2012] EWHC (Comm) 854, ¶ 25 (citing ¶¶74–78 
of the tribunal’s award). 
 128  See id. ¶ 25 (citing ¶ 78 of tribunal’s award).  West Tankers had appealed to the court on a point 
of law under the English Arbitration Law, section 69.  See id. ¶ 1. 
 129  See id. ¶ 54. 
 130  See id. ¶¶ 54, 72. 
 131  See id.; see also id. ¶ 55 (“[T]here is no qualitative difference between a decision by an arbitral 
tribunal on the merits, which is inconsistent with the approach that the Italian court might adopt in due 
course as to the merits, and a decision by the arbitral tribunal to grant a declaration that the Respondents 
[the insurers] should indemnify the Appellant [West Tankers] in respect of any liability the Italian court, 
having considered the merits, might in due course conclude the Appellant was under.”). 
 132  Id. ¶ 54. 
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Moreover, Mr. Justice Flaux’s view was that the principles elucidated 
by the ECJ—the  fundamental right of effective judicial protection and 
mutual trust which apply to the legal systems of the Member States—do not 
apply to private arbitral tribunals.133  He noted that the principle of effective 
judicial protection is not freestanding, but can only be invoked to protect a 
specific right, such as that provided under Article 5(3) of the Regulation.134  
However, that right “is only engaged before courts of the member states, 
not before arbitral tribunals.  If the tribunal does not have to give effect to 
the right under Article 5(3), then there is no reason why the tribunal does 
not have jurisdiction to grant equitable damages or an indemnity.”135 
Importantly for Mr. Justice Flaux, the ECJ decision was concerned 
with an anti-suit injunction granted by a national court, not by an arbitral 
tribunal. 
 
The . . . conclusion [of the ECJ] makes the point . . . that the grant 
by the English court of the anti-suit injunction is contrary to the 
mutual trust which member states accord to one another’s legal 
systems.  The Respondents [insurers] can point to no wider 
principle of European law which requires a private arbitral 
tribunal in one member state to repose mutual trust in any system 
of law other than that of the national court which supervises and 
protects the arbitral process in the jurisdiction where the 
arbitration takes place.136 
 
Thus, the High Court’s West Tankers 2012 decision gives support not only 
to an award of damages by an arbitral tribunal for breach of an arbitration 
agreement, but its reasoning also gives analogous support for a tribunal’s 
right to issue a form of anti-suit injunction when permitted by the laws or 
rules under which the tribunal operates. 
The High Court’s decision came down in April 2012 before the 
Brussels Recast was adopted.  However, nothing in the Recast Regulation 
would appear to undermine this decision.  Rather, the specifically described 
exclusions of arbitration set forth in Recital 12 would seem to support the 
reasoning that an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is not circumscribed by the 
Recast and that private tribunals are not subject to the principles imposed 
on Member State legal systems—such as effective judicial protection and 
mutual trust.  Nonetheless, an anti-suit injunction may well be seen as an 
interim measure, which may or may not be enforceable by national courts 
 
 133  See id. ¶¶ 59, 62. 
 134  See id. ¶ 63.  Article 5(3) provides the right to sue for tort damages in the jurisdiction where the 
tort occurred.  Brussels I, supra note 1, art. 5(3). 
 135  West Tankers Inc v. Allianz SpA & Anor, [2012] EWHC (Comm) 854, ¶ 64. 
 136  Id. ¶ 59. 
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and may not constitute an award that is enforceable under the New York 
Convention.137 
 
4.  Enforcement of an Arbitral Anti-suit Injunction 
 
 A case recently referred to the ECJ,138 and not yet decided, should 
shed light on whether an award issued by an arbitral tribunal that amounted 
to an anti-suit injunction is subject to enforcement in a Member State court 
under the New York Convention.139  In December 2013, the Lithuanian 
Supreme Court referred to the ECJ three questions concerning whether a 
Member State Court can refuse to enforce an arbitral award that amounted 
to an anti-suit injunction.140  The dispute grew out of a Shareholders’ 
Agreement concerning the ownership and operation of Lietuvos Dujos, 
Lithuania’s main gas provider.141  Shares were held by OAO Gazprom, the 
Russian energy giant; Ruhrgas Energie Beteiligungs AG, a German energy 
company; and the State Property Fund, acting on behalf of the Republic of 
Lithuania.142  An arbitration clause in the Shareholders Agreement provided 
for arbitration in Stockholm under the Rules of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce (SCC) of “any disputes or disagreements related to this 
agreement or its breach, validity, entry into force or termination.”143  When 
a dispute arose, however, the Republic of Lithuania, by its Ministry of 
Energy, filed a claim against Lietuvos Dujos, its directors, and board (the 
 
137  See, e.g., Peter J.W. Sherwin & Douglas C. Rennie, Interim Relief Under International 
Arbitration Rules and Guidelines: A Comparative Analysis, 20 AMER. REV. INT’L ARB. 317, 331–33 
(2009); see also James M. Gaitis, The Federal Arbitration Act: Risks & Incongruities Relating to the 
Issuance of Interim and Partial Awards in Domestic & International Arbitrations, 16 AM. REV. INT’L  
ARB. 1, 67–68 (2005); Tijana Kojovic, Court Enforcement of Arbitral Decisions on Provisional Relief, 
How Final is Provisional?, 18 J. OF INT’L ARB. 511, 520–28 (2001).  Interim measures are enforceable 
in countries that have adopted the 2006 amendments to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration.  See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 2006, supra note 118, art. 17 H (“An interim 
measure issued by an arbitral tribunal shall be recognized as binding and, unless otherwise provided by 
the arbitral tribunal, enforced upon application to the competent court, irrespective of the country in 
which it was issued . . . .”).  However, only a few Model Law states have adopted the 2006 amendments.  
See Status UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 106. 
 138  See Request for a Preliminary Ruling from the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas (Lithuania) 
Lodged on 14 October 2013 — Gazprom OAO, Other Party to the Proceedings: Republic of Lithuania 
(Case C-536/13), 2013 O.J. (C 377) 7. 
 139  See Case Summaries, Lithuania No. 2, OAO Gazprom v. The Republic of Lithuania, represented 
by the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania, Court of Appeal of Lithuania, 17 December 2012 
and Supreme Court of Lithuania, Civil Case No. 3K-7-326/2013, 10 October 2013, YB Comm. Arb. 
2013, XXXVII, 417–23 (Lith.). 
 140  Id. ¶¶ 81, 89. 
 141  Id. ¶ 4. 
 142  Id. ¶ 5. 
 143  Id. ¶ 4. 
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defendants) in its national court in Vilnius, Lithuania.144  The Republic of 
Lithuania asked for an investigation to be conducted and, if activities of the 
defendants were found to be improper, for managers to be removed and 
other steps to be taken.145  A few months later, Gazprom began an SCC 
arbitration claiming that the court action was in violation of the arbitration 
agreement.146 
The SCC tribunal issued an award that found that the Republic of 
Lithuania had partially breached the arbitration clause in the Shareholders 
Agreement and that it should withdraw certain requests from the court 
proceeding and limit other requests, essentially requiring the Republic of 
Lithuania to remove from the litigation the claims that could be 
arbitrated.147  Gazprom then sought recognition and enforcement of the 
award in the Court of Appeal for Lithuania.148 
In December 2012, the Lithuanian Court of Appeal refused to 
recognize the arbitration award issued by the SCC arbitral tribunal, in part 
because the award contained an anti-suit injunction.149  The Court of 
Appeal stated that if it enforced the award, the tribunal’s requirements that 
Lithuania withdraw or limit its claims in court 
 
would become mandatory in the territory of the Republic of 
Lithuania and would directly influence the legal capacity of legal 
entities participating in the proceedings and limit the jurisdiction 
of national courts. This would not only breach several 
constitutional principles related to the right of an individual to the 
hearing of his case in an objective, impartial and fair court . . . but 
also affect the sovereignty of the state . . . which would 
undoubtedly be contrary to the public policy of the Republic of 
Lithuania as well as to international public policy.150 
 
Thus, according to the Court of Appeal, the award was not enforceable 
under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, which permits a court 
to refuse to recognize and enforce an award that is against the public policy 
of the country. 
In its review of the Court of Appeal decision, the Lithuanian Supreme 
Court set forth the parties’ positions on the appeal, giving far more space 
and focus to Lithuania’s position.  Lithuania asserted that the arbitral award 
 
 144  Id. ¶ 3. 
 145  Id. 
 146  Id. ¶ 4. 
 147  Id. ¶ 6. 
 148  Id. ¶ 7. 
 149  Id. ¶¶ 27–31. 
 150  Id. ¶ 30. 
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established a restraint from settling the dispute before a court, the ECJ does 
not permit this to happen in litigation and should not permit it to happen in 
arbitration, and “a contrary ruling would establish the supremacy of 
arbitration over courts; this would disturb the balance of justice between 
these two dispute settlement mechanisms.”151 
The Supreme Court then elaborated the reasons it was referring legal 
questions to the ECJ for a ruling. It was particularly seeking from the 
international court a pronouncement on the proper relationship between the 
Brussels I Regulation and the New York Convention.152  The court noted 
that because of the supremacy of EU law “national courts must ensure the 
full effectiveness of EU Regulations, and they must refuse to apply all 
provisions of national law that are in conflict with this objective (in 
principle, including the rules in international treaties binding the Member 
State).”153  It therefore stated that a determination by the ECJ of the 
relationship between the New York Convention and EU law was necessary 
 
in order to properly decide this case and ensure that the Supreme 
Court of Lithuania, in its interpretation and application of the law, 
will not violate its duty as a national court to ensure the full 
effectiveness of EU law, thus upholding the principle of the 
supremacy of EU law.154 
 
Because the New York Convention has been adopted by individual Member 
States, but not by the European Union, whereas the Regulation is EU law, 
the court is arguing that the Brussels I Regulation should take precedence 
over the New York Convention.  However, assuming the ECJ decides this 
case after January 1, 2015 when the Recast becomes effective, it should be 
clear that the reverse is true; the New York Convention takes precedence 
over the Regulation.155 
The Supreme Court also urged that an arbitral anti-suit injunction 
should be subject to the Brussels I Regulation and prohibited by it.156  It 
noted that according to established jurisprudence, a court-issued anti-suit 
injunction was in violation of the Brussels I Regulation.  According to the 
Supreme Court, under a proper interpretation of the jurisprudence of the 
ECJ, arbitral injunctions should be prohibited by the same Regulation 
because 
 
 
 151  Id. ¶ 47. 
 152  Id. ¶¶ 62–69. 
 153  Id. ¶ 63. 
 154  Id. ¶ 69. 
 155  See discussion supra Part III.C. 
 156  Case Summaries, supra note 139, ¶ 80. 
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[a] contrary interpretation would mean that dispute settlement in 
arbitration would gain an advantage over dispute settlement in 
national courts, because antisuit injunctions issued by courts may 
not be recognized according to the rules of the Brussels I 
Regulation and antisuit injunctions issued by arbitral tribunals 
could limit the right of national courts to rule on their own 
jurisdiction to examine a concrete case.157 
 
Having made clear its position that the Brussels I Regulation should 
govern arbitral anti-suit injunctions and prohibit them, the Lithuanian 
Supreme Court then asked the ECJ to decide whether a Member State court 
can refuse to recognize an arbitral award that amounts to an anti-suit 
injunction which either orders a party (1) not to bring a case or (2) not to 
bring certain claims in a case and (3) to decide whether refusal is proper 
when the award restricts the right of a court to rule on its own 
jurisdiction.158 
The Lithuanian Supreme Court did not refer at any point to the Recast 
Regulation generally or to its Recital 12.  This is understandable because 
the Recast does not apply until January 2015.159  However, it is likely that 
the ECJ will take Recital 12 into consideration when it decides this case, 
given that by the time the decision is rendered the Recast will most likely 
be in effect and thus influence the ECJ’s decision.  For example, the 
Recital’s clear statement that the New York Convention takes precedence 
over the Brussels I Regulation160 would appear to undermine the Lithuanian 
 
 157  Id. 
 158  Id. ¶¶ 81, 89. The full text of the three specific questions submitted to the ECJ is as follows: 
 1. Whether, if an arbitral tribunal issues an antisuit injunction by which it restricts a party 
from bringing a case with certain claims before a court of a Member State, which, under 
the rules of jurisdiction in the Brussels I Regulation, has jurisdiction to rule on the merits 
of the civil case, the court of a Member State has the right to refuse to recognize such 
arbitral award, because the award restricts the court’s right to determine itself whether it 
has jurisdiction in the case under the rules of jurisdiction in the Brussels I Regulation; 
2. In case the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, whether the same is true in 
the case where the antisuit injunction issued by the arbitral tribunal orders a party to the 
proceedings to restrict its claims in a case that is being examined in another Member 
State, and the court of that Member State has jurisdiction to examine that case under the 
rules of jurisdiction in the Brussels I Regulation . . . 
3. Whether a national court seeking to ensure the supremacy of EU law and the full 
effectiveness of the Brussels I Regulation may refuse to recognize an award by an arbitral 
tribunal, if such award by the arbitral tribunal restricts the right of the national court to 
rule on its jurisdiction and competence in a case that falls under the jurisdiction of the 
Brussels I Regulation. 
Id. 
 159  See Brussels Recast, supra note 7. 
 160  See id. art. 73(2); id. Recital 12, ¶ 3.  As this Article was being finalized for publication, 
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Supreme Court’s position concerning the supremacy of EU law and the 
duty of a state court to ensure the full effectiveness of the Brussels I 
Regulation, to the detriment of the New York Convention. 
Moreover, the strong language in Recital 12 makes clear that 
arbitration is excluded from the Recast Regulation, ancillary proceedings 
involving arbitration are not governed by the Recast, parallel proceedings 
can go forward in two venues, and the ruling of one court on the validity of 
an arbitration agreement will not bind another court because preliminary 
questions about arbitration are not subject to recognition and enforcement 
under the Recast Regulation.  All of these provisions undercut the 
Lithuanian Supreme Court’s arguments that an arbitral anti-suit injunction 
should be governed by the Brussels Regime. 
Nonetheless, the ECJ may still find an argument for declaring the 
arbitral anti-suit injunction improper.  The reasoning could be based on the 
similar effect that anti-suit injunctions have, whether issued by a court or an 
arbitral tribunal.  Court-issued anti-suit injunctions are prohibited because 
they interfere with the power of another court to determine its own 
jurisdiction, and arbitrator-issued injunctions have the same adverse impact 
on the court.  Arguably, the injunction issued by an arbitrator is effectively 
a litigation maneuver to the extent that it affects a court’s power to rule on 
its own jurisdiction in a litigated matter. In addition, even though labeled an 
“award,” an arbitral anti-suit injunction is arguably not the kind of award 
envisioned by the New York Convention. 
Another approach that the ECJ could take would be to adopt the 
Lithuanian courts’ view that an arbitral award that embodies an anti-suit 
injunction restrains the court’s jurisdiction and thereby violates the public 
policy of Lithuania.  It would therefore not be enforceable under the New 
York Convention Article V(2)(b).161  Whatever the ECJ may decide, its 
 
Advocate General Wathelet delivered his opinion in “Gazprom” OAO.  See Case C-536/13, Opinion of 
Advocate General Wathelet in “Gazprom” OAO, CURIA (December 4, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/ 
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=160309&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ
=first&part=1&cid=6477.  The Advocate General’s opinion may or may not be followed by the ECJ.  
However, it describes Recital 12 of the Recast as changing the landscape after West Tankers 2009, 
finding that under the Recast the anti-suit injunction in that case would not be prohibited.  Id. ¶¶ 132–34.  
Advocate General Wathelet thus found that a prohibition of an anti-suit injunction granted by a court to 
protect arbitration cannot be justified under the Recast.  Moreover, the Advocate General stated that 
even if the ECJ decided not to consider the Recast (which only becomes effective in January 2015), or 
even if it disagreed with his interpretation, there was no reasonable way to apply the result in West 
Tankers 2009 to prohibit anti-suit injunctions issued by an arbitral tribunal.  Id. ¶ 153.  Although the 
Advocate General stated that the Supreme Court of Lithuania may have grounds under its own law to 
deny enforcement of the arbitration award, he concluded that the Brussels I Regulation does not require 
it “to refuse to recognize and enforce an anti-suit injunction issued by an arbitral tribunal.”  Id. ¶¶ 143, 
189.  He further concluded that an award that contains an anti-suit injunction cannot for that reason be 
refused enforcement under the New York Convention.  Id. ¶ 189. 
 161  The ECJ might look for analogous reasoning in its prior case, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. 
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opinion in this case will likely provide important guidance for courts and 
tribunals dealing with parallel proceedings in disputes that involve 
arbitration. 
In sum, the problems of parallel proceedings and the risk of 
inconsistent judgments, which were a major concern of the EU Commission 
and which prompted its 2010 Proposal for the Recast, remain problems 
after the Recast.  Yet the Recast has provided certain clarifications that will 
contribute to providing some certainty as to aspects of the interface between 
arbitration and cross-border litigation.  First, a court first seised is 
empowered to determine arbitrability for itself and (1) to make orders either 
referring the parties to arbitration while staying or dismissing the litigation, 
or (2) to decide that the arbitration is unenforceable and resolve the dispute 
on the merits.  If the court reaches the merits, its decision is subject to 
enforcement under the Recast Regulation.  Second, even if the first seised 
court decides the arbitration agreement is invalid, the second seised court is 
free to reach a different conclusion.  Thus, a ruling on validity of the 
arbitration agreement does not bind another court even if validity is 
determined as an incidental question related to subject matter that is within 
the Recast Regulation.  This means a “torpedo action” cannot stop a court 
that is second seised from ruling on the validity of the arbitration 
agreement.  Third, the New York Convention takes precedence over the 
Recast Regulation with respect to the enforcement of inconsistent awards.  
Fourth, ancillary procedures, such as appointment of arbitrators and 
decisions on vacatur or enforcement, are outside the scope of the Recast.  
Nonetheless, the devil is in the details, and, as will be discussed below, 
many difficulties can arise that will not admit of any easy or obvious 
solution. 
 
IV.  ARBITRATION’S FUTURE IN EUROPE AFTER THE 
RECAST 
 
Despite some welcome clarifications, the Recast does not solve the 
thorny issue of how courts and tribunals will deal with the enforcement of 
inconsistent judgments.  Possible solutions might include the reinstatement 
of the use of anti-suit injunctions by courts to stop a party that has agreed to 
 
Benetton Int’l NV, in which it held that a Member State must grant an application for annulment if an 
award is contrary to EU competition law even if the competition law claim had not been raised before 
the arbitral tribunal.  Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l NV, 1999 E.C.R. I-
3079.  The violation of EU law would render the award against the national public policy of the Member 
State.  Id.  The argument in Gazprom might be that EU law provides that anti-suit injunctions interfere 
with court jurisdiction, so that such interference is equally violative whether it comes from a court or a 
tribunal.  However, the analogy would not be on all fours with ECO Swiss because in Gazprom there is 
no EU law prohibiting anti-suit injunctions by arbitral tribunals, since arbitration is excluded from the 
Brussels Recast. 
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arbitrate from going forward with litigation.  However, using anti-suit 
injunctions to protect arbitration does not seem likely given the resistance 
to this mechanism by the ECJ and by many policy makers in the civil law 
system where the anti-suit injunction is effectively not in use.  Nonetheless, 
it may be that arbitrators, rather than courts, will undertake some form of 
anti-suit injunction in order to protect the arbitral process.  In any event, 
there may be other methods going forward, outside of actions by courts and 
legislatures, which can nudge the European Union toward more harmony 
and uniformity in the interface between arbitration and litigation. 
 
A.  Problems Going Forward 
 
Given the priority accorded to the New York Convention, it may not 
be difficult for a court to decide whether to enforce an arbitral award or an 
inconsistent court judgment when both come before it at the same time.  
However, the timing will not always be so well coordinated.  A court may 
be asked to enforce a judgment when an arbitration award that is likely to 
be inconsistent has not yet been handed down.  Could the claimant, even 
though no award has yet been issued, seek a partial final award from the 
tribunal that the arbitration agreement is valid and then try to use that 
partial final award as a way of blocking an inconsistent judgment in a 
foreign court? 
Another 2012 West Tankers decision (West Tankers 2012 Court of 
Appeal), although not directly analogous, lends some credence to the above 
scenario.162  In 2008, West Tankers had received an arbitral award in its 
favor, declaring that it had no liability to the insurers.163  West Tankers then 
sought and received leave to enforce the declaration of nonliability as a 
judgment, and a judgment was entered against the insurers pursuant to 
section 66(2) of the English Arbitration Act of 1996 (West Tankers 
2011).164  The insurers then moved to set aside this order,165 arguing 
primarily that a declaration of negative liability could not be enforced 
because it was simply a declaration of the parties’ rights with no executory 
aspect that required enforcement.166  However, both the English High Court 
(Commercial Court)167 and the Court of Appeal168 upheld the order.169  Both 
 
 162  See West Tankers Inc. v. Allianz SPA & Anor, [2012] EWCA (Civ) 27 (Eng.). 
 163  See West Tankers Inc. v. Allianz SpA & Generali Assicurazione Generali, [2011] EWHC 
(Comm) 829, ¶ 6 (Eng.) (referencing the award by Mr. Justice Field in the lower court decision). 
 164  See id. ¶¶ 1, 7. 
 165  See id. ¶ 1. 
 166  See id. ¶ 15. 
 167  See id. ¶ 32. 
 168  See West Tankers Inc. v. Allianz SPA & Anor, [2012] EWCA (Civ) 27, ¶¶ 39–41 (Eng.). 
 169  Although the court did not think that an award consisting of a declaration of rights, particularly a 
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courts were persuaded by West Tankers’ argument that its award should be 
enforceable as a judgment under the English Arbitration Act as “an 
additional weapon in the Italian proceedings and/or a shield against 
enforcement if those proceedings were to result in a judgment . . . that the 
owners [West Tankers] were to blame for the collision.”170 
West Tankers feared the insurers might obtain a favorable judgment in 
Italy and then seek to have that judgment enforced in England pursuant to 
the Brussels I Regulation.  The Regulation provides that “[a] judgment 
given in a Member State shall be recognized in the other Member States 
without any special procedure being required.”171  However, it also 
provides that a judgment shall not be recognized “if it is irreconcilable with 
a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the Member State 
in which recognition is sought.”172  In the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice 
Toulson appeared to believe that recognizing and enforcing the arbitral 
award as a judgment under English law would protect West Tankers under 
the Brussels I Regulation from the consequences of a potential enforcement 
in England of an inconsistent judgment from the Italian court.173 
Nonetheless, even though under section 66 of the English Arbitration 
Act of 1996 an award may be “enforced in the same manner as a judgment 
or order of the court to the same effect,”174 it is not clear that such a 
judgment is entitled to be enforced as a Regulation judgment.  In the West 
Tankers 2011 case before the Commercial Court, the attorney for the 
insurers cited the case of Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH v. Emilio Boch175 for 
the proposition that an arbitration award enforced as a judgment was not a 
Regulation judgment. 
 
[T]o be a “judgment” for purposes of the [Brussels] 
Convention,176 the decision must emanate from a judicial body of 
 
declaration of negative rights (i.e., no liability) was always enforceable as a judgment, it found the facts 
of this case supported enforcement. It cited with favor the lower court opinion of Mr. Justice Field who 
had stated that 
[w]here . . . as here, the victorious party’s objective in obtaining an order under s66 (1) 
and (2) is to establish the primacy of a declaratory award over an inconsistent judgment, 
the court will have jurisdiction to make a s66 order because to do so will be to make a 
positive contribution to the securing of the material benefit of the award.  Id. ¶ 14. 
 170  Id. ¶ 12. 
 171  Brussels I, supra note 1, art. 33 ¶ 1; Brussels Recast, supra note 7, art. 36 ¶ 1. 
 172  Brussels I, supra note 1, art. 34 ¶ 3; Brussels Recast, supra note 7, art. 45 ¶ 1(c). 
 173 After acknowledging West Tankers’ concerns, Lord Justice Toulson cited the Brussels I 
Regulation’s prohibition on recognizing an inconsistent foreign judgment.  See West Tankers Inc. v. 
Allianz SPA & Anor, [2012] EWCA (Civ) 27, ¶ 13 (Eng.). 
 174  Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 66 (Eng.), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/ 
england.arbitration.act.1996/doc.html#1. 
 175  Case C-414/92, Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH v. Emilio Boch, 1994 E.C.R. 1-2237. 
 176  The Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
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a Contracting State deciding on its own authority on the issues 
between the parties; accordingly, a settlement recorded in an 
order of a court was not a judgment of the purposes of the 
Convention.177 
 
In other words, to qualify as a Brussels Convention (or Brussels I 
Regulation) judgment, the judgment would have to be one that a court had 
made in deciding the issues between the parties, not simply a recording of 
what the parties (or tribunal) had done.178  Moreover, the Recast 
Regulation’s complete exclusion of arbitration also casts doubt on whether 
an arbitration award that is enforced as a judgment in a national court can 
be treated as a judgment under the Recast.  Certainly, according to Recital 
12, paragraph 2, a decision by one court on the validity of an arbitration 
agreement does not bind a court of another Member State.179  In addition, 
paragraph 4 of Recital 12 states that “[t]his Regulation should not apply. . . 
to any action or judgment concerning . . . recognition or enforcement of an 
arbitral award.”  Thus, the enforcement of an arbitral award as a judgment 
would appear not to provide protection against an inconsistent foreign 
judgment under the Recast Regulation. 
Assuming an arbitration award cannot be transformed into a Recast 
Regulation judgment by a national court, how much protection will it 
receive via the New York Convention?  As noted by Lord Justice Toulson, 
West Tankers wanted its declaratory award to be enforced as a judgment to 
serve both as a shield in England, against a potential inconsistent Italian 
judgment, and as a sword in the Italian proceedings.180  Although the Recast 
provides that the New York Convention will take precedence over the 
Recast Regulation, if the insurers came to enforce an Italian judgment in 
England against an existing arbitral award, the New York Convention 
 
Commercial Matters 1968 was the predecessor of the Brussels I Regulation, which superseded the 
Convention. See Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (“Brussels I”), EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/ 
judicial_cooperation_in_civil_matters/l33054_en.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2014). 
 177  See West Tankers Inc v. Allianz SpA & Generali Assicurazione Generali, [2011] EWHC 
(Comm) 829, ¶ 18 (Eng.). 
 178  In Effects of Foreign Judgments Relating to International Arbitral Awards: Is the ‘Judgment 
Route’ the Wrong Road?, Maxi Scherer argues that a judgment on an arbitration award is different from 
a court judgment because of its ancillary nature.  That is, the award judgment relates to a prior 
adjudication.  Scherer, supra note 107, at 627–28.  She notes that ‘[a]ccordingly, only the initial award 
and not the ancillary award judgment should, in principle, be open to recognition or enforcement . . . .”  
Id. at 628. 
 179  A ruling given by a court of a Member State as to whether or not an arbitration agreement is null 
and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed should not be subject to the rules of recognition 
and enforcement laid down in this Regulation regardless of whether the court decided on this as a 
principal issue or as an incidental question.  Brussels Recast, supra note 7, Recital 12, ¶ 2. 
 180  See West Tankers Inc. v. Allianz SPA & Anor, [2012] EWCA (Civ) 27, ¶ 12 (Eng.). 
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would not apply.  The Convention applies “to the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than 
the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought 
. . . .”181  In the West Tankers arbitration, the award was made in England 
and the action to enforce it as a judgment was also in England, so its 
enforcement there could only be under English law, not under the 
Convention.  Thus, if the award and an inconsistent judgment had come 
before the English court at the same time, it could not be enforced under the 
New York Convention because enforcement of the award was sought in the 
same state where the award was made. 
Moreover, it is likely that in many cases, as is true in West Tankers, 
the court of the state where the award was made will be called upon to 
protect an award made in its jurisdiction against an inconsistent foreign 
judgment.  Thus, it appears that the applicable law governing enforcement 
of the arbitral award would be national law and not the New York 
Convention or the Recast Regulation, since arbitration is excluded from the 
Regulation.  Therefore, the New York Convention could not serve as a 
shield in England to protect an arbitral award made in England.182 
The question then is whether an English court can protect such an 
award under its national law and whether it can refuse to enforce a foreign 
Member State judgment on the basis of its inconsistency with an arbitration 
award, given that the Brussels Recast provides that such a judgment “shall 
be recognized . . . without any special procedure being required.”183 
 
 181  New York Convention, supra note 4, art. I(1). The English Arbitration Act of 1996, section 100, 
defines a New York Convention award as “an award made, in pursuance of an arbitration agreement, in 
the territory of a state (other than the United Kingdom) which is a party to the New York Convention.”  
Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 100 (Eng.).  The situation is different in the United States, however, 
based on its implementation of the second  sentence of Article I(1) of the New York Convention, which 
provides that the Convention “shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in 
the State where there recognition and enforcement are sought.”  New York Convention, supra note 4, 
art. I(1).  In the United States, implementing legislation in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) defines a 
non-domestic award as one that “involves property located abroad, envisages performance or 
enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.”  9 U.S.C. 
§ 202 (2014); see Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 182  Unlike in the United States, in most Contracting States to the New York Convention, the use of 
the second criterion⎯applying the New York Convention to awards not considered as domestic awards 
in the State where recognition is sought⎯“has remained a dead letter.” ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, 
THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 22 (1981). According to Gary Born, “the 
overwhelming tendency of national legislatures is to adopt a strictly territorial approach to arbitral 
awards, treating any awards made on national territory as domestic (subject to local annulment actions), 
and any awards made outside national territory as foreign/non-domestic (not subject to local annulment 
actions, and instead protected by the Convention’s recognition requirements.)” BORN, supra note 79, at 
2380–81. 
 183  Brussels Recast, supra note 7, art. 36, ¶ 1; Nielsen, supra note 7, at 591.  One way for a Member 
State court to give more protection to an arbitration award seated in its territory that also needed to be 
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However, the New York Convention may be able to function as a 
sword against an inconsistent judgment if it can be applied to obtain 
enforcement of an award in a state other than the state where the award was 
made.  Whether the Italian court would recognize and enforce a negative 
declaratory award under the Convention is not clear.  Nor is it clear whether 
a partial final award declaring that an arbitration agreement was valid 
would be recognized and enforced under the New York Convention in a 
foreign court and thereby prevent that court from finding the same 
agreement to be invalid. 
In West Tankers 2012, the English court’s recognition of the 
declaratory award as a judgment came after there was a final award.  
Although a partial final award would occur earlier in the arbitral 
proceedings, there is no obvious reason why it should not be recognized 
and enforced as an award in a foreign court under the New York 
Convention. 
However, the timing is important.  As discussed above, a court that has 
already declared an arbitration agreement invalid may be unlikely to 
enforce an inconsistent award from another jurisdiction that would 
undermine its own decision despite the priority of the New York 
Convention.  It would likely use a ground under the Convention such as 
public policy to resist a decision in another Member State that was counter 
to its own decision.184  If the court had not yet decided the question, 
however, the New York Convention should require enforcement of the 
partial final award on the arbitration agreement’s validity. 
Finally, there is also the unresolved question of whether the complete 
exclusion of “ancillary procedures” from the scope of the Recast Regulation 
means that anti-suit injunctions are included within those procedures and 
 
enforced in its territory would be to revive the notion of enforcement of a nondomestic award under the 
New York Convention.  Such an award, as in the United States, could be based on some international 
connection or relationship, such as one or more of the parties being from a different country or the 
subject matter of the dispute being international business or property.  See Harry Ormsby, The Recast 
Brussels Regulation and “Domestic” Arbitrations, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Dec. 9, 2014), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/12/09/the-recast-brussels-regulation-and-domestic-
arbitrations/ (stating that paragraph 3 of Recital 12 of the Recast, which provides that the New York 
Convention has priority over the Recast, would be more useful in resolving conflicts between 
enforcement of inconsistent awards and judgments if “domestic awards which are sufficiently 
international in nature are able to be categorised as non-domestic awards for the purpose of the 
Convention”). 
 184   See New York Convention, supra note 4, art. V(2) (“Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral 
award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where the recognition and 
enforcement is sought finds that . . . . The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to 
the public policy of that country.”).  Depending on the reason for a court’s finding of invalidity of the 
arbitration agreement, the ground for refusal might also be Article V(2)(a), which provides for non-
recognition and non-enforcement if “[t]he subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement 
by arbitration under the law of that country.” New York Convention, supra note 4, art. V(2)(a). 
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therefore cannot be prohibited under the Recast.  These and many other 
questions will arise once the Recast Regulation becomes applicable to the 
Member States in 2015. 
 
B.  Possible Solutions 
 
1.  What the Recast Accomplishes 
 
By making clear that a decision of invalidity by a court first seised 
does not stop either a second seised court or a tribunal in the second court’s 
jurisdiction from going forward, the Recast can serve to deter some parties 
who are simply filing a suit in order to harass or delay.  In addition, 
assuming the ECJ does not overturn decisions such as that of the English 
High Court holding in West Tankers 2012 that tribunals can award both 
damages for breach of an arbitration clause and an indemnity, these 
potential remedies might dissuade parties from initiating vexatious parallel 
proceedings. 
There is also the possibility of using anti-suit injunctions to stop 
parallel proceedings.  It is probably unlikely that court-issued anti-suit 
injunctions will be reinstated after the Brussels Recast (even though they 
might arguably be considered “ancillary proceedings” outside the scope of 
the Recast).  Nonetheless, arbitral tribunals may well issue orders for the 
purpose of preventing “prejudice to the arbitral process itself” under rules 
such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or under the UNCITRAL Model 
Law185 unless the ECJ rules otherwise. 
The value of an arbitral order that would function like an anti-suit 
injunction should be considered in light of the harm that can be caused by a 
parallel proceeding that is initiated in bad faith for the purpose of delay and 
harassment.  The purpose of UNCITRAL Rule 26(2)(b) is to provide a 
tribunal with a way of controlling against conduct that would undermine the 
arbitral process.  International arbitrators, who are generally chosen because 
they are believed to be fair-minded, independent, and impartial, should be 
entitled to be trusted not to use such measures often or indiscriminately.  
Because the New York Convention does not prevent parallel proceedings, 
this vulnerability to abuse could and should be shored up by a mechanism 
such as an anti-suit injunction.  Even lawyers trained in the civil law 
tradition find that there are times when an anti-suit injunction should be 
issued by an arbitral tribunal to protect the integrity and effectiveness of the 
arbitral process.186  An anti-suit injunction can accomplish this, particularly 
 
 185  See UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 118, art. 26 (2)(b); see UNCITRAL MODEL 
LAW 2006, supra note 118, art. 17(2)(b). 
 186  See, e.g., Gaillard, supra note 117, at 264 (“[A]ntisuit injunctions may . . . have an edifying 
effect, that of reminding the parties of their voluntary acceptance of international arbitration for the 
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if backed by the possibility that the tribunal could ultimately award 
damages if the litigating party did not withdraw its suit. 
The counter argument is that sometimes the initiation of a parallel 
proceeding is not commenced simply as a tactic to delay but rather because 
the party has a legitimate claim that it never was a party to the alleged 
arbitration agreement.  Thus, such a party would maintain that it should not 
be barred from pursuing its claim in court by the potential imposition of a 
damages claim by the tribunal if it goes forward.  However, in considering 
the two different motivations⎯delay versus legitimate claim⎯the goals of 
efficiency and speed would certainly push toward the legitimate claim 
being presented in the arbitration proceeding.  In many instances, if the 
tribunal rejects a challenge to its jurisdiction, that claim will be reviewed by 
a court.187  Moreover, the tribunal itself may well decide that there is no 
valid arbitration agreement.  On balance, an order by the tribunal to a party 
to cease litigation in another jurisdiction would seem more likely to deter 
harassing litigation than to undermine a legitimate claim. 
Although the Recast has provided a number of helpful clarifications, 
more steps can still be taken to deal with the remaining problems.  The next 
section will consider some possible ways of developing a more uniform and 
predictable interface between arbitration and litigation. 
 
2.  What Remains to be Done 
 
The forces at work in the last few years on whether and to what extent 
the Brussels I Regulation should impact international arbitration appear to 
have grown out of the inherent tensions between national law, regional 
(EU) law, and international law.  In the struggle over whether arbitration 
should come within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation, those favoring a 
national law approach and those favoring an international law approach 
ultimately found common ground.  That common ground was to continue to 
exclude arbitration from the Brussels I Regulation.188  The Member States 
preferred the autonomy to apply their own national law rather than some 
attempted harmonization by the European Union.  One might think that 
 
resolution of their dispute, and protecting the integrity of the arbitral process.”); Lévy, supra note 120, at 
123 (“[A]rbitrators should not refrain from issuing anti-suit injunctions where such measures appear 
necessary to protect the arbitral proceedings.”). 
 187  See, e.g., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 1985, supra note 76, art. 16(3) (“If the arbitral tribunal rules 
as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any party may request, within thirty days after having 
received notice of that ruling, the court specified in article 6 to decide the matter, which decision shall 
be subject to no appeal . . . .”). 
 188  The reason that arbitration was excluded from the original Brussels Convention in 1968 was 
because it was believed that the New York Convention and the 1961 European Convention on 
International Commercial Arbitration already sufficiently regulated international commercial arbitration.  
See Radicati di Brozolo, supra note 18, at 425. 
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those favoring an international approach would not support the Member 
States’ application of their own law to international arbitration.189  
However, what seemed to be the concern of many internationalists was that 
more regional control of arbitration of any kind through regulation would 
limit the flexible rules in some Member States.  That flexibility has 
permitted competition between legal systems in different Member States 
and provided broad freedom and autonomy in matters of arbitration.190  
There is, however, a certain inevitability that there will and there should be 
a further harmonization of laws affecting arbitration.  Commentators have 
pointed out that already Member State laws on arbitration are affected by 
EU law.191  Public policy decisions by arbitrators in individual Member 
States are impacted by EU policy.192  Moreover, in the EU there are existing 
legal provisions outside of the Recast Brussels Regulation that relate to 
arbitration.193  Professor Massimo Benedettelli has listed these areas where 
there is room for further harmonization of arbitration law:  subject matter 
arbitrability, permitting arbitrators to seek preliminary rulings from the ECJ 
as to the proper interpretation of EU Treaties and EU legislation, “creat[ing] 
a new ground of exclusive jurisdiction . . . under the . . . competence of the 
State of the seat of the arbitration,”194 and “recognition and enforcement of 
judgments and awards.”195 
 
 189  Of course, the international arbitration community is not monolithic, and many favored the EU 
Commission 2010 Proposal.  See supra text accompanying notes 71–77. 
 190  See Radicati di Brozolo, supra note 18, at 424–25. 
 191  See, e.g., Allen B. Green & Josh Weiss, Public Policy and International Arbitration in The 
European Union, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 661, 666–68 (2011) (discussing Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss 
China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l NV, 1999 E.C.R. 1-03055, in which the ECJ held that a Member State 
must grant an application for annulment if an award was contrary to EU competition law even if the 
competition law claim had not been raised before the arbitral tribunal). 
 192  See, e.g., Maud Piers, How EU Law Affects Arbitration and The Treatment of Consumer 
Disputes: The Belgian Example, 59-JAN DISP. RESOL. J., 76, 79 (2005) (“Belgian case law and 
jurisprudence generally accept that arbitrators have a duty to raise public policy issues on their own 
initiative. This is consistent with the arbitrator’s duty to the parties to issue an enforceable award. An 
arbitral award that violates a directly applicable public policy could be set aside or not enforced. Were it 
otherwise, parties could choose arbitration to evade EC-public policy-based rules.”) 
 193   See, e.g., Benedettelli, supra note 18, at 585, 592 (“Starting with a decision in 1992 in the case 
of Elf Aquitaine-Thyssen/Minol, the EU Commission has required the settlement by arbitration of 
private disputes arising in connection with alleged breaches of those behavioral or structural measures 
which the Commission may impose when granting conditional merger clearances under Articles, 6, 
paragraph 1, lit. (b) and 8, paragraph 2, lit. (b), Reg. (EC) no. 139/2004.” (citations omitted)). 
 194  Benedettelli, supra note 18, at 615.  The United States has developed to some extent a doctrine of 
preference for the jurisdiction of the seat of arbitration, using the concepts of “primary jurisdiction” for 
the court of the seat and “secondary jurisdiction” for other courts.  See, e.g., Karaha Bodas Co. v. 
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak, 364 F.3d 274, 287 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 195  Benedettelli, supra note 18, at 616; see also Benedettelli, supra note 18, at 613–19.  In the 
European Union, one possible avenue of harmonization might be for the European Union itself to adopt 
the UNCITRAL Model Law and require Member States to adopt it or conform their laws to it.  A 
number of Member States have already adopted a version of this law, which is a very highly regarded 
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In the meantime, however, the problem not resolved by the Recast—
that arbitration and litigation of the same issues can proceed simultaneously 
with the high risk of inconsistent awards (i.e., the issues of parallel 
proceedings)—is a global problem, not merely a European regional 
problem.196  Lack of a global solution or even a reasonably harmonized 
approach to the problem undermines predictability and therefore confidence 
in the arbitration process.  Even the process in Europe will not be uniform 
because courts in EU countries where the mechanism is available can 
continue to issue anti-suit injunctions against a party who has brought a 
lawsuit in a non-Member State in breach of an arbitration agreement.  Non-
EU countries, such as the United States and Singapore, will also in certain 
circumstances issue anti-suit injunctions.  Having a global consensus on 
how best to avoid parallel proceedings in violation of an arbitration 
agreement would help support the fundamental objective of the New York 
Convention to enforce arbitration agreements. 
One approach toward harmonization could be to give more deference 
to the court of the seat.  This would have been one result of the Commission 
Proposal discussed earlier.197  The idea has already been developed in the 
United States and elsewhere to some extent by means of the concept of 
“primary” and “secondary” jurisdiction.198  The concept derives from a 
reading of the New York Convention that gives preferential status to the 
court of the seat with respect to procedural matters (Article V(1)(d)) and to 
the setting aside of awards (Article V(1)(e)).199  “Primary” jurisdiction is 
said to belong to the court with the jurisdiction to annul or set aside an 
award while “secondary” jurisdiction is that of other courts.200  Encouraging 
 
lex arbitri; it has been adopted in sixty-seven countries.  See Status UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 
106.  However, there would likely be strong resistance from countries like England and France who are 
quite predisposed to their own laws. 
 196  See, e.g., Grace Gunah Kim, Note, After the ECJ’s West Tankers: The Clash of Civilizations on 
the Issue of an Anti-Suit Injunction, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 573, 603 (2011); Andrew Pullen, 
The Future of International Arbitration in Europe: West Tankers and the EU Green Paper, 12 INT’L 
ARB. L. REV. 56, 61 (2009). 
 197  See supra text accompanying notes 68–71. 
 198  See Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 297–310. 
 199  See W. Michael Reisman & Heide Iravani, Symposium, The Changing Relation of National 
Courts and International Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 5, 12–17 (2010) (“[T]he 
Convention establishes two tiers of review competence, making a sharp distinction between so-called 
‘primary’ or ‘venue’ jurisdictions and ‘secondary’ or ‘enforcement’ jurisdictions.”).  This view of 
primary and secondary jurisdiction with respect to vacatur and enforcement of awards has been 
criticized by commentators who believe the annulment of an award at the seat is not necessarily 
preclusive of the possibility of enforcement in other countries.  See, e.g., Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, 
The Enforcement of Annulled Awards: Further Reflections in Light of Thai-Lao Lignite, 25 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 47 (2014); Marc J. Goldstein, Annulled Awards in the U.S. Courts: How Primary is 
“Primary Jurisdiction?,” 25 AMER. REV. INT’L ARB. 19 (2014). 
200  See Reisman & Iravani, supra note 199, at 12; see also Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. 
v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1997); CHRISTOPHER DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE 
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an international perspective that broadens the concept to include the court at 
the seat of arbitration as having primary jurisdiction under Article II of the 
Convention on the question of the validity of the arbitration agreement 
could contribute to a more harmonized approach to parallel proceedings 
occurring between a court and a tribunal. 
In considering any potential areas of harmonization, however, a 
cautionary note is in order: based on the resistance shown to EU regulation 
of arbitration in the run-up to the Recast Regulation, further attempts at 
harmonization of arbitration laws and rules in the European Union should 
not stray far from existing international standards and practice and should 
maintain to the greatest extent possible the autonomy of private parties.  
There should be significant flexibility in fixing the balance among EU 
Rules, national rules, and rules chosen by the parties. 
There are, however, a number of ways that arbitration practice could 
be nudged toward uniformity of practice rather than harmonization of laws.  
Soft law instruments such as the IBA Rules on Taking of Evidence have 
already created a widely acceptable approach for taking evidence in 
arbitration hearings that is a hybrid of common law and civil law.201  The 
IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitration 
(adopted May 25, 2013), although somewhat controversial and not yet 
widely in use, reflect international concerns over different ethical standards 
applicable to arbitration counsel from different jurisdictions.202  Other soft 
law instruments could be created that would encourage but not require their 
 
ARBITRATION 682 (2011) (“The New York Convention provides a carefully structured framework for 
the review and enforcement of international arbitral awards. Only a court in a country with primary 
jurisdiction over an arbitral award may annul that award. Courts in other countries have secondary 
jurisdiction; a court in a country with secondary jurisdiction is limited to deciding whether the award 
may be enforced in that country. The Convention mandates very different regimes for the review of 
arbitral awards (1) in the countries in which, or under the law of which, the award was made, and (2) in 
other countries where recognition and enforcement are sought. Under the Convention, the country in 
which, or under the arbitration law of which, an award was made is said to have primary jurisdiction 
over the arbitration award. All other signatory states are secondary jurisdictions, in which parties can 
only contest whether that state should enforce the arbitral award.”). 
 201  See Timo Ylikantola, Document Discovery in Current International Arbitration Practice: Are 
There Differences Between Common Law and Civil Law Traditions?, 16 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. 
& BUS. 123, 131 (2012) (“One of the main purposes of the IBA Rules of Evidence is to provide an 
efficient, economical and fair process, especially to parties who are from different legal cultures. 
Therefore, the IBA Rules of Evidence reflect procedures in use in many different legal systems and they 
are designed to be used in connection with or to supplement institutional, ad hoc or other rules or 
procedures governing international arbitrations.”). 
 202  At the IBA’s 17th Annual International Arbitration Day in February 2014, delegates noted that 
arbitrators come from different legal cultures and that “there is a current compelling need for the 
development of a code of ethics in international arbitration and for the adaptation of tribunals and 
institutions to the adoption of such a code.”  Sam Chadderton, Arbitration: What Does the Future 
Hold?, 68 IBA GLOBAL INSIGHT 49, 50–51 (2014). 
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adoption by the parties.203  Such instruments could be created by private 
groups and organizations, such as UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, or the IBA.  
Another potentially influential private group is the European Law Institute 
(ELI), created in 2011 and modeled in part after the American Law Institute 
in the United States.204  According to a European Commission Press 
Release in 2011, the ELI will “identify possible solutions to help improve 
the application of EU law, and develop suggestions for reforms of EU 
legislation in all areas.”205  Thus, the ELI could provide a framework for 
examining the application of arbitration laws and play an important role in 
developing solutions and suggesting reforms. 
One possible model for achieving flexibility while encouraging more 
harmonization is the proposed Regulation on a Common European Sales 
Law (CESL).206  Proposed in 2011,207 the CESL remains controversial, but 
there are elements in its structure that might be profitably used in an 
arbitration context.  If adopted, the CESL would provide a harmonized 
contract law regime within the national law of a Member State.208  It would 
apply only when the parties opted to use it.  If the parties chose it, however, 
the national contract law would not apply, unless some aspect of contract 
law was not covered by the CESL.209  In addition, the CESL could be 
chosen when one of the parties was from a third country, if the other party 
was from a Member State.210 
If a similar concept to CESL were developed for arbitration law, it 
would permit parties a choice between two laws: either the Member State’s 
law at the seat or the regional arbitration regime.  Having an optional 
arbitration regime would permit a Member State to keep its original 
arbitration law, but the State might be inspired to modify that law if it found 
that most parties were choosing the alternate arbitration regime.  Moreover, 
the option of a regional arbitration regime might ultimately lead to a 
 
 203  See generally INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND SOFT LAW (Andrea K. Bjorklund and 
August Reinisch eds., 2012) (containing interesting perspectives on the role of soft law instruments in 
international investment law). 
 204  Press Release, European Comm’n, European Commission Welcomes Foundation of the 
European Law Institute (June 1, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-
666_en.htm. 
 205  Id. 
 206  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common 
European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final (Oct. 11, 2011) [hereinafter CESL]. 
 207  Id. 
 208  See id. at 6. Despite opposition from Germany and the United Kingdom, the CESL appears on 
path to adoption.  See European Parliament votes for Common European Sales Law, OUT-LAW.COM 
(Feb. 27 2014), http://www.out-law.com/articles/2014/february/european-parliament-votes-for-
common-european-sales-law/.  Parliament voted in favor of the law on February 26, 2014.  Id.  The next 
step would be adoption by the European Council of Ministers, which would cause it to become law.  Id. 
 209   See CESL, supra note 206, at 6. 
 210   See id. at 7. 
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broader international consensus on parallel proceedings between arbitration 
and litigation. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
In the Explanatory Memorandum to its 2010 Proposal on Brussels I, 
the EU Commission explained its concern about the interface between 
arbitration and litigation. 
 
[B]y challenging an arbitration agreement before a court, a party 
may effectively undermine the arbitration agreement and create a 
situation of inefficient parallel court proceedings which may lead 
to irreconcilable resolutions of the dispute. This leads to 
additional costs and delays, undermines the predictability of 
dispute resolution and creates incentives for abusive litigation 
tactics.211 
 
The Commission Proposal of a lis pendens rule within the Recast 
Brussels Regulation that would have given a jurisdictional preference to the 
court or the tribunal of the seat seemed to be a reasonable solution to the 
problem of parallel proceedings.  However, it would have ended the 
exclusion of arbitration from the Recast Brussels Regulation and might 
have potentially led to other court decisions like West Tankers 2009 that 
could blur the lines between the Regulation’s application to litigation and to 
arbitration.  The rejection of the Commission Proposal by the Parliament 
and the Council leaves the parallel proceedings issue unresolved, although 
some clarification was achieved.  The statement that precedence is to be 
given to the New York Convention over the Recast Regulation was a 
helpful step although it is not altogether clear how this will work in 
practice.  Other provisions from Recital 12 also bring needed clarity.  A 
second seised court can reach a different conclusion about an arbitration 
agreement’s validity, and the ruling of the first court will not be binding on 
the second court.  However, decisions about enforcement when there is a 
judgment that is inconsistent with an arbitral award will not be easy to 
implement in a fair and reasonable way. 
More work needs to be done to create a predictable and transparent 
interface between arbitration and cross-border litigation, which should be 
the focus of private international law organizations and groups.  If the 
camel’s nose is not going to be permitted under the tent, then nonetheless a 
way must be found for the tent dweller and the camel to work together for 
their mutual benefit. 
 
 211  Commission Proposal, supra note 70, Explanatory Memorandum, § 1.2. 
